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Abstract 
In 2008, the EU’s Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) launched the 
EU Naval Force (NAVFOR) Atalanta, the Union’s first-ever naval operation. In 
this military mission, Sweden and Finland took different degrees of participation. 
This thesis analyse how adaption of national defence can explain different degrees 
of burden-sharing in EU military operations. The theoretical framework is based 
on Foreign Policy Analysis, and a new theoretical model is developed. The paper 
uses a comparative case study and the research methods are qualitative. From the 
empirical analyse, the following conclusions can be made. First, adaption of 
national defence can explain different degrees of burden-sharing by the fact that 
different EU Member States give different priorities to CSDP military operations 
in their national defence planning.  Second, the concept of adaption is of 
importance when analysing burden-sharing since CSDP military operations 
require more than political will; it requires that EU Member States make practical 
adjustments in their national defence.  
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1 Introduction 
In December 2008, the EU’s Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) 
achieved a significant “first” when the EU Naval Force (NAVFOR) Atalanta, the 
Union’s first-ever naval operation, was launched to combat maritime piracy off 
the coast of Somalia. The operation illustrates, since it is still ongoing, ‘a 
significant step in Europe’s nascent security and defence policy’. Atalanta was 
designed to contribute to the international community’s nascent campaign against 
Somali piracy, which has grown into a major international security problem. As 
such, the aim of the operation is to protect the World Food Programme’s (WFP) 
humanitarian convoys and other vulnerable vessels in and around Somalia’s 
Indian Ocean coast.1  
 However, all Member States of the European Union (EU) contribute to 
Operation Atalanta, albeit in very different ways. Some Member States provide 
only mandatory financial assistance to the mission, whereas other countries 
contribute operationally – by deploying military personnel and equipment. More 
specific, the Netherlands, Greece, Finland, United Kingdom, France, Germany, 
Spain, Italy, Belgium and Sweden have contributed so far with vessels to 
operation Atalanta. Furthermore, Spain, France, Luxembourg, Portugal and 
Sweden have also transferred surveillance aircraft to the region. In contrast, 
Slovenia, Austria, Bulgaria, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, 
Hungary, Ireland, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland and Slovakia – as many as 14 
Member States - decided not to contribute with any resources to the operation.2  
 Nevertheless, EU Member States can chose to take part of EU military 
operations or not but they also have the possibility to contribute to a high degree 
in the mission or contribute to a low degree. More specific, Sweden acted as the 
leadership state for the mission in the summer of 2010, where the country had a 
surface vessel and a lake reconnaissance in the area. In contrast, Finland 
contributed to the mission in a more limited way – by only sending humanitarian 
aid through voluntary organizations and a mine-vessel.3 Interestingly, Sweden and 
Finland decided to take different degrees of participation in operation Atalanta; 
                                                                                                                                                   
 
1 Nováky, Niklas (2012) ”Deploying Military Force Under CSDP: The Case of EU NAVFOR Atalanta”, 
University of Aberdeen. Working Paper, UACES Annual Conference in Passau, p. 1.  
2 Soder, Kirsten (2010), “EU Crisis Management: an assessment of member state’s contributions and positions”, 
Draft for the COST Action Meeting on 10 June 2010. Recived 2015-01-04 from http://www.ies.be/files/Soder-
D1-NOT4WEB.pdf. p. 3-5. 
3 Statsrådets redogörelse om Finlands deltagande i EU:s militära krishanteringsinsats Eunavfor Atalanta 
(211/2006), p. 1.  
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Sweden participated to a great extent while Finland participated to a limited 
extent.4  
 The observant reader may notice that these two Member States have central 
similarities. First, none of them is a member of the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization (NATO). Second, they have both pursued a policy of neutrality 
through history. Third, their actions in the security and defence dimension of the 
Union are often seen to be comparable.5 With this in mind, two such similar 
nations in the EU could be expected to contribute to operation Atalanta to the 
same extent but instead; the degree of participation in CSDP military operations 
seems to differ in an inconsistent pattern.  
1.1 The research problem 
CSDP military operations are collective actions that require economic, military 
and political resources from the participating states in the EU.6 However, due to 
the fact that all decisions with regard to participation in those missions are still 
being taken at the national and not the EU level, flexibility appears for EU 
Member States to decide for themself if, and to what extent, they would like to 
contribute to a military operation with resources.7 In turn, this voluntary base 
within the dimension of CSDP gives also the Member States a choice when it 
comes to adapt their national defence or not to the EU framework, a choice that 
will determinate the operational capacity for each Member State in the Union to 
take part of military missions. As a result, some Member States participate to a 
high degree in CSDP military operations and other Member States participate in a 
more limited way.8   
 Moreover, as a EU military operation may be seen to produce a public good, 
such as regional stability, this is something that can be enjoyed in equal amounts 
by both contributing and non-contributing EU Member States. This indicates that 
Member States can enjoy the benefit from an operation without paying for it. As 
such, one may argue that the burden between the EU Member States should be 
more equally shared because today, the Member States can use the opportunity to 
be free riders in the process.9  
                                                                                                                                                   
 
4 Erinkveld, Bob (2014), p. 14.  
5 Möller, Ulrika, Bjereld, Ulf (2010), ”From Nordic neutrals to post-neutral Europeans: Differences in Finnish 
and Swedish transformation”, in Cooperation and Conflict, nr 45, p. 354.  
6 Nováky, Niklas (2011), p. 3.  
7 Kaddous, Christine (2009) ”External Action under the Lisbon Treaty”, in Ceci n'est pas une Constitution - 
Constitutionalisation without a Constitution?, Ingolf, Pernice, Evgeni, Tanchev (eds). Nomos, p 182-184.  
8 Soder, Kirsten (2010), p. 3-6.  
9 Nováky, Niklas (2012), ”Deploying Military Force Under CSDP:The Case of EU NAVFOR Atalanta, 
Conference papers, UACES 42th Annual Conference, University of Aberdeen, p. 4-5. 
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 Noteworthy, if no EU Member State voluntarily wants to contribute to CSDP 
military operations, expect others to deal with international crises first or use the 
free rider card in the EU process, the Union will not be able to live up to its 
ambitious aim in the future: to be an international security actor and respond 
rapidly to international crisis.10 
1.2 Purpose and research question 
The empirical purpose of this study is to examine why the degree of burden-
sharing11 was different between Sweden and Finland when they decided to 
contribute with resources to operation Atalanta. It is important to know what 
influence EU Member States to share some of the burden when they launch a new 
operation, since operational demands, the resources made available by Member 
States, together determine how successful operations are.12 
 The theoretical purpose of this study is to shed light on a new factor, which 
assumes to be of importance when EU Member States decide which and how 
much resources they should contribute with to a CSDP military operation: 
‘adaption of national defence’.13 This factor assumes to determinate the 
operational capacity of a country to take part of military missions and therefore, it 
should affect the degree of burden-sharing between EU Member States.  
 Moreover, the factor of adaption has hitherto been neglected in the literature, 
and therefore, this paper intends to contribute to the academic sphere by first, shed 
light on the use of the concept of burden-sharing when analysing military 
operations, and second, shed light on how adaption of national defence can 
explain different degrees of participation between EU Member States. Against 
this background, the research of this thesis is based on the following question:  
 
 
 
How can adaption of national defence explain different degrees of burden-sharing 
in EU military operations? 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                   
 
10 Soder, Kirsten (2010), p. 3-6. 
11 In this paper, the definition of burden-sharing is EU Member States different degrees of participation in CSDP 
military operations – which is determinated by the resources they contribute with. In chapter two, this discussion 
will be furthered examined.  
12 Engberg, Katarina (2014) The EU and Military Operations, A comparative analysis, Routledge, p. 2-3.  
13 In this paper, the definition of adaption of national defence is the role CSDP military operations have been 
given in EU Member States defence planning. In chapter two, this discussion if further examined. Note that 
adaption of national defence in this thesis is sometimes only referred to as ‘adaption’.  
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In order to examine this research question, this thesis will be based on a 
comparative case study. By comparing Sweden and Finland in the decision-
making process of operation Atalanta, it will be examined how adaption of 
national defence can explain the different degree of burden-sharing in CSDP 
military operations. The general expectation of this study is that a high degree of 
national adaption14 would generate a high degree of burden-sharing15 in CSDP 
military operations. In contrast, a low degree of adaption of national defence 
would generate a low degree of burden-sharing in CSDP military operations.  
1.2.1 Relevance  
Since 2003, the Member States of the EU have exhibited collective activism in the 
field of military crisis management by conducting six military operations in the 
framework of the CSDP. Many scholars have taken keen interest in explaining the 
emergence and institutionalization of the CSDP, whereas others have focused on 
specific operations. As a result, there are ever-expanding literatures on the 
CSDP.16 
However, there have been almost no attempts to form explanations of why the 
degree of participation varies between the Member States. Or in other words, why 
some Member States actually decide to participate in CSDP military operations 
and bear their burden of the collective action, and why other Member States do 
not participate in a mission and therefore, do not bear their burden to the mission. 
As such, the absence of research that examine ‘burden-sharing’ in CSDP military 
operations has left a large gap in our understanding of how Member States share 
the costs of collective action in ‘out-of-area’ military operations.17 Moreover, 
burden-sharing is a relevant issue in EU security governance that is likely to grow 
in importance as the EU seeks an autonomous ability to act effectively across the 
spectrum of global and regional security governance challenges. It is also 
reasonable to expect that a deepening of EU prerogatives in security will only 
occur if the Member States perceive that the costs and benefits of collective action 
are fair.18 Furthermore, the limited research that has identified factors, which may 
explain why some Member States decide to participate or not in military 
                                                                                                                                                   
 
14 A high degree of national adaption is defined as follows: CSDP military operations have been given a central 
role in national defence reforms.  
15 High degree of burden-sharing is definded as follows: Sweden and Finland’s operational resources are 
essential in the realisation of operation Atalanta.  
16 Nováky, Niklas I. (2011), p. 2-3.  
17 Ibid.  
18 Dorussen, Han, Kirchner, Emil J., Sperling, James (2009), ”Sharing the Burden of Collective Security in the 
European Union”, in International Organization 63, The IO Fundation, p. 789-810. 
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operations, focuses mainly on security and political factors. However, the factor 
“D”, as in defence, with its resource implications, is treated lightly. 19  
As such, this paper intends to focus on the substance of the decision and the 
connection between political military goals and national defence. By adopting this 
focus, the paper intends to contribute to our understanding of military operations – 
by shed light on adaption of national defence, which in turn makes the thesis 
relevant in order to reduce the gap in the literature. Hopefully, building a model 
with an emphasis on the “D” factor would provide the academic community with 
better tools to answer important but hitherto neglected research questions. 
1.3 Contentual limitations and components of interest  
The CSDP military operations in the EU are just one factor related to the Union’s 
external activities. Among others, this area includes the European Neighbourhood 
Policy (ENP), foreign trade issues, development policy and the representation of 
the EU as an international entity in other international organizations – like the 
United Nations (UN) and NATO.20 Therefore, a thorough examination of the 
entire external activities sphere is either possible or intended.  
 Accordingly and for the sake of clarity, a distinction must first be made 
between the Unions’ external action and the Common Foreign and Security Policy 
(CFSP) – where the latter make an implicit reference to security aspects. A 
distinction must also be made between the CFSP and the CSDP – where the latter 
explicitly deals with defence issues.21 As has already been indicated above, the 
focus of this paper will be exclusively on CSDP and military operations. Like 
argued earlier, the reasons for choosing CSDP as the primary object of interest are 
multifaceted. Briefly revisited, the majority of EU Member States have not been 
threatened by the target countries of CSDP military operations and they have not 
had any clear interest at stake in them.22 Moreover, even if the chance is small, it 
is possible – due to the voluntary base to contribute to military missions – that in 
the future, no Member State will be willing to realise operations because ‘no other 
Member State does’. As such, recent development in international security 
policies are alarming and thus call for military crisis management operations 
made by the EU.  
 The degree of participation within each Member State will determinate the 
EU’s future position in international security policy - today characterized by an 
                                                                                                                                                   
 
19 Engberg, Katarina (2014) The EU and Military Operations, A comparative analysis, Routledge, p. 2-3.  
20 Ramses, A. Wessel (2000), ”The Inside looking Out, consistency and delimitation in EU external relations”, 
Common Market Law rewiev, Vol 37, p. 1151.  
21 Combarieu, Gilles (2008), p. 67-68.  
22 Nováky, Niklas I. (2011), p. 2-3.  
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incipient American withdrawal.23 Therefore, if the EU does not want to lose its 
faintly consolidated stand as an international security actor – the capabilities of its 
security and defence components in the Member States are essential. The figure 
below intends to illustrate how the different categories in the Lisbon treaty – EU’s 
external activities, CFSP, CSDP and military operations – are connected.24  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
Figure 1: Illustration of the relationship between EU’s external activities, CFSP and CSDP.  
 
Furthermore, as illustrated by the figure above, military operations are not the 
only factor, which forms the CSDP. Another aspect within this area concerns the 
EU’s attempts to develop and establish a European Defence Industrial and 
Technological Base (DITB) and ‘an open and transparent European Defence 
equipment market’. This aspect will be excluded since its detailed consideration 
would lead to a perspective angle simply too broad for the limited space of this 
paper. Further, even though a European Defence market is planning to be 
‘fundamental for underpinning European military capabilities’25 their economic 
and political importance for the EU itself but also for its international actorness is 
hereby acknowledged but not further discussed. Therefore, by eliminating these 
important but too fundamental aspects from the field of inquiry, a sharper focus 
on the primary object of study, the degree of participation in military mission, is 
to be guaranteed.  
 Furthermore, this paper will not focus on crisis management missions and the 
civilian capability development process within the EU. It will not either use the 
common theory of Europeanization, as this concept has been used to a large extent 
in the literature. Finally, the study will not use traditional game theory and the 
concept of prisoner’s dilemma- type to analyse collective action in the EU. The 
motivating for this is the fact that incentive structure of a collective action is a 
                                                                                                                                                   
 
23 Combarieu, Gilles (2008), p. 67-68. 
24 The figure is made by the author in order to illustrate the relationship between the different areas, note that the 
propositions are only estimated and not absolute in any sense.  
25 Cf, Andersson, Jan, Joel (2013) ”Defence Industry and Technology – The Base for a more capable Europé”, in 
The Routledge Handbook of European Security, Whitman, Sven, Richard (eds.), Taylor and Francis Group, 
Londoin, p. 105.  
EU’s External  
Activities CFSP 
CSDP 
Military 
operations 
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prisoner’s dilemma only if a procedure is expected to produce a public good and 
played once. In reality, as mentioned above, the procedures of CSDP military 
operations have been played more than once.   
1.3.1 Thesis outline  
This thesis is structured as follows; in chapter two, the theoretical points of 
departure will be discussed. This chapter evaluates how burden-sharing can be 
used within the framework of Foreign Policy Analysis (FPA) and it sheds light on 
a new variable: adaption of national defence. This chapter will also provide 
discussions about the two concepts in this paper: adaption of national defence and 
burden-sharing. Within chapter three, the methodological considerations will be 
discussed. The thesis will be based on a comparative analysis – with the aim to 
investigate the role of adaption of national defence. Within chapter four, the 
empirical analysis will be made. This section is structured by first examine 
burden-sharing and then adaption. Within the last chapter, number five, the 
conclusions from the empirical analysis will be discussed, with the general aim of 
examine the role of adaption of national defence in relation to the degree of 
burden-sharing in CSDP military operations.  
  12 
2 Theoretical framework  
This chapter will introduce the theoretical framework of this paper. First, 
theoretical points of departure will be presented in order for the reader to 
understand the theoretical framework and the specific focus in this thesis. Second, 
a debate regarding CSDP and EU military operations in previously research will 
be introduced. Third, the framework of FPA is presented and different variables at 
different levels of analysis are examined. Fourth, the chapter discuss burden-
sharing in military operations. Fifth, a discussion about, and elaboration on, the 
new variable of adaption will be introduced. Finally, theoretical considerations are 
presented and motivations for the theoretical choices are identified.   
2.1 Theoretical points of departure 
The theoretical points of departure in this paper are found in the dimension of 
Foreign Policy Analysis (FPA). This theoretical school can be seen as a subfield 
in political science and it sheds light on different theoretical explanations in 
relation to traditional IR-theory’s. The scientific study of foreign policy 
distinguishes itself from other scholars primary by the fact that it strives to 
identify how internal decision-making processes affect how states act at the 
international arena.26  
Further, traditional IR-theories have a tendency to focus on states as 
unanimous actors in order to understand different patterns and actions. In contrast, 
FPA intends to ‘open up’ the unanimous state and thereby, it covers also lower 
levels of analysis. Moreover, FPA offers a more comprehensive analytical 
approach, which also allow a deeper understanding of individual states action.27 
As such, the research problem of this paper requires a more multifaceted 
theoretical framework like FPA. Thus, this thesis does not reject the traditional 
IR-theories but it assumes that they are not enough when analysing different 
degrees of burden-sharing.  
However, within the framework of FPA, this paper lays out some foundations 
for a theoretical model that could be used to analyse burden-sharing in CSDP 
                                                                                                                                                   
 
26 Hudson, Valerie M. (2005), ”Foreign Policy Analysis: Actor-Specific Theory and the Ground of International 
Relations”, in Foreign Policy Analysis, 1, p. 1-30. 
27 Hudson, Valerie M. (2005), p. 1-30. 
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military operations. The model will pay focus to a new variable ‘adaption of 
national defence’ and it will be built on some insights from previous research. As 
such, in contrast to previous research regarding burden-sharing in CSDP military 
operations, this thesis pays focus to Sweden and Finland’s adaption of national 
defence to the EU framework, and thereby, a new theoretical model with 
emphasis on adaption needs to be developed.  
2.2 CSDP and previous research  
The speedy development of research on CSDP has gone hand in hand with a rapid 
growth in the policy itself. The field has comprised overlapping generations of 
research, ranging from studies on the emergence of the policy area – through 
investigations of its implementation in the EU Member States, to emerge new 
theoretical frameworks in order to explain particular aspects of the policy. 
Furthermore, the military operations have also been examined in the literature to a 
large extent.28  
 However, explanations for the emergence of CSDP are often informed by 
certain theoretical assumptions. For example, the neofunctionalist approach would 
predict the UK’s change of heart towards an autonomous European defence, the 
Union’s failure to rise challenge of Balkans wars, Europe’s wish to balance the 
United States and also, the practical needs of crisis management in a changed 
security environment.29  
 Works on policy implementation have often been concerned with the 
conceptions, deployment and evaluation of CSDP missions. The insights from 
sociological institutionalism have been particular authoritative in conceptualising 
the role of EU level bureaucracy, while research on Europeanization in EU 
foreign policy has sought to explain national positions within the EU security 
project.30 Furthermore, in a less fashion way, authors have examine CSDP as a 
‘discursive battlefield’ – due to the constellations of actors involved in a daily 
politics over what European security is about.31 Research has also focused on, to a 
                                                                                                                                                   
 
28 Kurowska, Xymena (2011), ”Introduction the Role of Theory: in Research on Common Security and Defence 
Policy”, in Explaining the EU’s Common Security and Defence Policy, (edi) Kurowska, Xymena, Breuer, 
Fabian, Political and International Studies Collection, Series: Palgrave Studies in European Union Politics, p. 2-
5.  
29 P, Van Ham (2000), ”Europé’s Common defence Policy: Implications for the Transatlantic Relationship”, 
Security Dialogue, Vol. 31(2), p. 215-228.  
30 Gross, E (2009), The Europeanization of National Foreign Policy. Continuity and Change in European Crisis 
Management, Basingstoke and New York: Palgarve Macmillian.  
31 Kurowska, Xymena, Pawlak, P (2012), The Politics of European Security Policies: Actors, Dynamics and 
Contentious Outcomes, London and New York, Routledge, p. 36.  
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high degree, on the relationship between NATO and the EU32, the role of defence 
industries within the Member States and the constantly question if the Union will 
have a common military capacity in the future or not.33  
However, when it comes to the literature regarding specific CSDP military 
operations, observers may also find some common dominators. First, 
examinations of success or failure in CSDP military operations are made to a high 
degree in the academic literature.34 Among commentators, it is fashionable to 
highlight the persistent military weakness of the EU by comparison with the US 
or NATO. In contrast, others do shed light on the fact that the Union has 
established strong political legitimacy in military affairs based on the rule of law 
and effective multilateralism. Second, many authors highlight the capability gap 
in the EU and according to them, the capability goals has not been reached – 
despite all efforts and due to the fact that it has been almost 15 years since the 
Helsinki Goals were presented and over 10 years after the adoption of a revised 
version.35 Third, researchers have payed attention to the flexibility in the Union 
when it comes to contribute with resources to military operations.36 Some have 
highlighted that contributions vary in force level between the Member States and 
as a result, some nations contribute more than others in order to realise a specific 
mission.37 Fourth, authors have highlighted under what circumstances the EU 
undertake military missions38 and further, why some Member States participate in 
military operations and why others do not.39  
While some of the academic concepts concerning CSDP are of interest for this 
study, others are less useful for the investigation of the different degrees of 
participation in operation Atalanta. This is, consequently, an area that calls for 
further research, which moves beyond some of the more common approaches of 
political science and international relations mentioned above.  
Previously research does, however, remain on a rather general and theoretical 
level and it needs to be complemented by a further disaggregation of driving 
factors in order to acquire a more in-depth understanding of the dynamics behind 
degree of participation in the EU’s military operations. As such, the academic 
literature seldom provides a deeper analysis of the complex interplay between 
political decisions and military resource factors, which, as noted above, are of 
particular concern here. As a result, this study will move beyond the convenient 
                                                                                                                                                   
 
32 Acikmese, Dizdarogly (2014) ”Dynamics of Cooperation and Conflict in NATO-EU Relations” in 
Uluslararasi Iliskiler – International relations, p. 131-163.  
33 Grand, Camille (2013) ”CSDP: Is there a new Chapter?”, The Polish Quartley of International Affairs, no 3, p. 
9-18.  
34 Peen Rodt, Annemarie (2011), ”The EU: A Successful Military Conflict Manager?”, Departement of Politics, 
Languages and International Studies, University of Bath, UK, p. 99-122.  
35 Grand, Camille (2013), p. 14.  
36 Gierich, Bastian (2010), p. 42-45.  
37 Soder, Kristine (2010), p. 4.  
38 Engberg, Katarina (2014).  
39 Nováky, Niklas (2011).  
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dichotomy of ‘why and how’ CSDP emerged, if EU military operations may be 
seen as a success or failure, the Union’s relations with NATO and the reasons for 
the often highlighted military capability gap. Not because these distinctions are 
irrelevant altogether, but because it covers mostly clear categories of just ‘why or 
how’. By doing this, the literature hitherto fails to capture the interaction between 
decision-makers and the adoption of national defence – and the way they colour 
each other.  As such, by focusing on the EU as an collective use of force in the 
context of military operations, this study will add to the literature by using the 
concept of burden-sharing in order to analyse why the degree of participation 
varied between Finland and Sweden when they decided to participate in operation 
Atalanta. 
2.3 The study of Foreign Policy Analysis  
As mentioned above, FPA can be seen as a subfield in the scholar of International 
relations (IR). As such, the assumption that human decision makers acting singly 
and in groups are the ground of all that happens in international relations, but FPA 
is specific positioned to provide the concrete theory that can reinvigorate the 
connection between IR actor-general theory and its social science foundation.40 
The explanation of FPA includes the process and resultants of human decision 
making with reference to known consequences for foreign entities. Moreover, the 
horizon of interest is limited to decision making performed by those with the 
authority to commit resource. Furthermore, one may be examining not simply a 
single decision, but also a sequence of decisions taken with references to a 
particular situation.41  
However, it is the explanations of FPA wherein one finds its most noteworthy 
hallmarks: the factors that influence foreign policy decision making and foreign 
policy decision makers. FPA views the explanation of foreign policy decision 
making as multifactorial – with the desideratum of examining variables from 
more than one level of analysis. As such, explanatory variables from all levels of 
analysis, from micro to macro level, are of interest to the analyst - to the extent 
that they effect the decision making process. As a result from this multilevel 
approach, insights from many intellectual disciplines such as psychology, 
sociology, organizational behaviour, economics and so forth, will be used to 
foreign policy analysis in their effort to explain foreign policy decision making.42   
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Another important hallmark of the FPA is the emphasis on agent-oriented 
theory. States are not agents because states are abstractions and thus have no 
agency. As such, only human beings can be true agents, and it is their agency that 
is the source of all international politics and all change therein.43 According to 
Marijke Breuning, the circumstances at the international arena and the individual 
decision-maker mentioned above can be captured by the concept of levels of 
analysis. In his research, Foreign Policy Analysis, A Comparative Introduction, he 
presents three different levels that can be used in the framework of FPA: the 
individual, the state and the international system. Moreover, Breuning highlights 
that these three levels correspond to the different foci of FPA: individuals ponder 
options and make decisions, states engage in foreign policy behaviours and the 
interaction between states in the international system yields outcomes.44 In line 
with Breuning, Hudson also discuss in her article different levels of analysis. 
Thus, she shed light on a fourth level: the bureaucratic one. Hudson argues that 
organizational process and bureaucratic politics affects foreign policy.45 Together 
these different authors highlight four levels: the individual level, the bureaucracy 
level, the state level and the international level.  In order to make organizational 
studies within the framework of FPA; the many different variables are structured 
in relation to the many different levels of analysis mentioned above. As such, each 
level of analysis is assigned with one or a few variables. Factors like individual 
personalities and threat perception do often belong to the individual level.46 
Factors like structures and laws within a state and the role of administration 
belong to the bureaucracy level.47 Factors like institutional framework, interest 
groups and public opinion belong to the state level.48 Finally, factors like 
interactions between states and the concept of power often belong to the 
international level.49  
As mentioned above, burden-sharing should be rooted in the framework of 
FPA. This is mostly due to the fact that both FPA and burden-sharing focuses on 
decision-making and the process leading to a decision.50 As such, the next step in 
the theoretical framework of this paper is to examine burden-sharing and discuss 
how it can explain different degrees of participation in CSDP military operations.   
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2.4 Burden-sharing 
Many of the early studies of burden-sharing concerned the disproportionate 
sharing of support for international undertaking such as NATO. The central focus 
of these studies tends to be on how fair the economic burden of investing in 
military capabilities was spread across Allies. A famous study within this 
framework is ‘An Economic Theory of Alliances’ by Mancur Olson and Richard 
Zeckhauser. The authors use the size of nation’s national income and put it in 
relation to the percentage of nations defence budget - in order to measure how 
much a specific country contributed to deterrence.51  
 In line with Olsen and Zeckhauser, Todd Sandler also discusses in his work the 
costs of deterrence within allies. However, in contrast to the research presented 
above, Sandler shed light on private goods that an alliance may promote – a factor 
that he highlights as important means for sharing burdens and fostering stability 
within an alliance. Moreover, Sandler argues that the costs of deterrence were 
spread more equally across allies than Olsen and Zeckhauser contend; because 
alliance members are more likely to invest in defence goods that are private 
within the alliance but public within the state that produce them.52  
In 1980, new security structures inspired many academics to shift their 
attention of alliance organisations to instead study why states participate in 
military operations and how they determine the resources they contribute to 
them.53 One of the first scholars who conducted these new types of studies 
includes Charles A. Kupchan. In his research, Kupchan examine the determinants 
of intra-alliance behaviour by investigate a single case study: NATO’s efforts to 
address security problems in the Persian Gulf since 1979.  Kupchan examine 
factors that are likely to affect NATO’s decision to act: external threat, alliance 
security dilemma and domestic politics. In his conclusion, he argues specific that 
the main reason for the decision to act was due to US pressure on other Allies.54  
There have been extremely few attempts to study burden-sharing in the 
context of EU and CSDP military operations. However, two different articles can 
be identified; one made by Dorussen, Kirchner and Sperling in 2009 and one 
made by Niklas Nováky in 2011. Dorussen et al, compare in their article EU 
burden-sharing in four different policies: assurance, prevention, protection and 
compellence. By using the Kendall tau-test, they evaluate burden-sharing relative 
to a country’s ability to contribute. The test shows that wealthier EU members 
                                                                                                                                                   
 
51 In their research they present a model which indicates that an international organization composed of nations 
acting in their national interests, there will be a general tendency for the larger nations to bear disproportionality 
large shares of the costs - and for the smaller nations to make little or no contribution to the common use. 
52 Sandler, Todd (1977), ”Impurity of defence: an Application to the Economics of Alliances”, Kyklos, Vol. 30, 
Fasc. 3, p. 453.  
53 Nováky, Niklas I. (2011), p. 2.  
54 Kupchan, Charles A., Kupchan, Clifford A. (1991), p. 344.  
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carry a somewhat disproportionate burden in the provision of prevention, and 
large Member States in the provision of compellence. However, the main 
conclusion is that the aggregated burden of collective security governance in the 
Union is shared quite equally.55 In line with Dorussen et al, Niklas Nováky 
discusses in his research burden-sharing and CSDP military operations. Thus, 
Nováky holds an even more theoretical approach than Dorussen et al since he 
aims to present a theoretically informed model that would explain different 
degrees of participation in CSDP operations by using the concept of burden-
sharing.56   
As discussed above, previous research regarding burden-sharing refers often 
to the economic burden of investing in military capabilities – “the cost of 
deterrence”. However, Nováky uses the concept in relation to Member States 
different degrees of participation.  As such, this paper will operationalize burden-
sharing in line with Nováky and therefore, the meaning of the concept will be 
different degrees of participation in CSDP military operations. Further, the 
operational resources, which Sweden and Finland have contributed with, are 
essential when measuring burden-sharing. What kind of degree a Member State 
takes, is determined by how much or how little operational resources that the 
country contributes with to a CSDP military operation.  
This study will be based mainly on Nováky’s research, since his model of 
burden-sharing intends to explain a question in line with this paper: why some EU 
member State contributes to a high degree to CSDP military operations and why 
some EU Member States only contributes in a more limited way. The next section 
will examine Nováky’s model.  
2.4.1 Explaining burden-sharing: Nováky’s model  
In his research, Nováky discusses the overall question of why EU Member States 
contribute to military operations.  In order to analyse this question, Nováky 
highlights that Member States participate in CSDP military operations due to a 
variety of interests and pressures. Nováky divides these different factors into two 
categories: positive and negative dichotomy. The first one, positive dichotomy, 
refers to contributions that are made in order to realise something as an outcome 
of that contribution, whereas negative reasons refer to contributions that are made 
against one’s initial preferences. Moreover, positive reasons include furthering 
national interests, furthering collective European interests and furthering 
cosmopolitan interests. In contrast, negative reasons include direct pressure from 
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fellow Member States and indirect pressure such as fear of being left outside a EU 
core.57    
Nováky does also highlight the question of why Member States do not 
contribute to military operations; some Member States are unable to contribute 
due to a number of constraints. These constraints can be categorized by 
distinguishing between resource constraints and political constraints. The first one 
refers to shortages in material capabilities, such as military overstretch, and the 
second one refers to political constraints, such as lack of political will and 
domestic pressure.58   
However, Nováky argues that these explanations are hampered by a number of 
problems. First, they are highly empirical – they are influenced by factors from 
multiple levels of analysis that scholars consider to influence Member States in 
military operations. Second, these theoretical explanations cannot explain how the 
variables relate to each other and weather there is a hierarchy between them or 
not. Third, they give an impression that the reasons why EU Member States 
participate in CSDP military operations are not shaped in any way by the degree 
of participation. As such, previous research - according to Nováky – does not 
consider the possible reasons for why a Member State contributes for example 
with 5000 ground troops and why another Member State only contributes with a 
single staff officer to the Operational Headquarters of the operation.59  
In order to answer to these challenges, Nováky constructs a new theoretical 
framework that would explain burden sharing in CSDP military operations. By 
doing this, Nováky argues that one should be able to understand how EU Member 
State prioritises different influences and which ones are more important than 
others.60  In his new theoretical model, Nováky distinguishes between material 
and immaterial factors, and between endogenous and exogenous factors.61  
Moreover, he uses variables from four different levels of analysis; the public 
level, the government level, the regional level and the international level. All 
factors and levels of analysis are illustrated in Appendix 1. However, it can be 
argued that Nováky’s model needs to be transformed in order to be able to use in 
empirical studies and also, in order to serve the purpose of this study. As such, the 
next section will discuss this further and thereby shed light on adaption.  
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2.5 Introducing ‘adaption of national defence’  
Nováky argues that a model that aims to explain which variables that affect 
burden-sharing cannot provide sufficient answers by only focusing on only one 
level of analysis, like some traditional IR theories tend to do. He bases this 
statement on the risk of oversimplifying the specific context in which decision-
makers in EU Member States have to work when they discuss participation in a 
new military operation. Moreover, he argues that in order to eliminate such a risk, 
theoretical models need to be able to link variables from at least four levels of 
analysis: the international, regional, government and public level.62   
However, this paper will not include all variables that Nováky sheds light on 
and therefore; all levels of analysis will not be examined. This choice is based on 
the following motivations. First, if this paper would aim to include all 21 factors 
that Nováky presents in his model (see Appendix 1), it would not be possible to 
isolate each factor in the empirical analysis. Consequently, it would not be 
conceivable to examine the significance of all factors in two different countries 
and therefore, it would be a challenge to identify which variable have the 
strongest impact on the dependent variable. Second, in his research, Nováky does 
not elaborate on specific factors. Therefore, it’s hard to interpret how the variables 
should be used. As such, some variables in Nováky’s research can be argued to be 
solid to operationalize and therefore, difficult to use in empirical studies.  
In addition, this paper intends to gain a deeper understanding of the interplay 
between political decision-makers and resource factors,63 and how this colour the 
operational capability of EU Member States. According to Engberg, it is just this 
process, the interplay between political and resource factors, that determinate the 
political will of a country to contribute or not to a military operation.64  
However, even if a country has the political will, it may not have the 
operational capacity to contribute with resources. In order to gain capacity, 
countries can adapt their national defence by making resources available to EU 
military missions. In other words, EU Member States can take practical 
undertakings towards the advancement of the CSDP.65  As such, if EU Member 
States have adapted their national defence to the EU´s capability targets, 
increasingly active participation in peace building efforts, there will be more 
resources available to CSDP military operations. In contrast, if EU Member States 
have not adapted their national defence, there will be fewer resources available.  
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Noteworthy, one may assume that if a country does not have the operational 
capacity to participate, it is obvious that that specific country cannot take part in a 
military mission. However, according to Engberg, it is not that black or white in 
reality: political decision-makers often ignore military resource constraints.66 This 
results in overstretching of the forces available for military crises management. 
Engberg argues that the absolute numbers of forces alone cannot describe the 
limitations but the time they can be deployed in an area of operation, so called 
sustainability, represents constraints. As such, high readiness and prolonged 
sustainability are opposing poles in defence planning.  
Moreover, the idea that the 1.8 million troops enlisted in the European forces 
could readily be transformed into forces with high readiness, does not take 
resource constraints into account. Engberg does therefore shed light on the fact 
that sustainability of these forces will eventually reach their limit. This have some 
countries, like the UK and the Netherlands, experienced in the Iraq and Afghan 
wars.67 Against this background, adaption of national defence seems to be of high 
importance in order for EU Member States to have the real operational capacity to 
contribute with sustainability resources and therefore, the interplay of political 
and resource factors will be analysed through the concept of adaption in this 
paper. As such, adaption of national defence is central to use in the analysis of the 
interplay between the driving factors that shape decision-making on military 
interventions in the EU.   
However, the concept of adaption is used frequently in discourse on theorizing 
security and defence integration. It is usually used in a constructivist context, 
which implies that a kind of re-adjustment based on socialization and learning has 
occurred. According to Pernille Rieker, adaption can occur due to a day-to-day 
interaction at the European level.68 In line with Rieker, Michael E. Smith argues 
that élite socialization, bureaucratic reconstructing, constitutional changes and 
changes in public perceptions occur through adaption. According to Smith, 
demands of foreign and security policy co-operation are therefore much greater 
than those outlined in treaty articles.69 This form of adaption tends to assume that 
external structures can influence actor’s preferences. However, according to 
Nikolaj Petersen, adaption can also be used in a more rational perspective. 
Petersen explains adaption as a theory, which assumes that policy-makers 
manipulate the balance between their society and their external environment. 
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According to this theoretical point of view, the goal is to secure the functioning of 
societal structures in a situation of growing interdependence.70  
As discussed above, the concept of adaption has been used in different ways in 
previous research. However, this study will borrow some thoughts in this previous 
research when operationalize adaption in a theoretical way. First, the meaning of 
the word in this paper will be the role CSDP military operations has been given in 
national defence planning. If EU Member States adapts their national defence in 
favour of CSDP military operations, this will be given a central role in their 
national defence planning. In contrast, if they do not adapt their national defence 
in favour of CSDP military operations, the role of CSDP military operations will 
be limited in their national defence planning. The degree of adaption will decide 
which capacity a EU Member State has in order to take operational part of a 
CSDP military operation.  
Moreover, in this paper, the concept of adaption will be used as a theoretical 
tool in order to examine the importance of practical undertakings in national 
security- and defence policy. As such, this approach is based on Rieker and 
Smith’s form of adaption: external structures, like the operational demands and 
capability targets of the EU, may influence national decision-makers in their 
choice of national defence structures. In turn, this paper does not intend to analyse 
why states adapt. Instead, it will analyse how Member States have adapted to the 
operational demands and capability targets of the EU. The specific theoretical 
operationalization of adaption in this paper will be furthered discussed below. 
2.5.1 Changing Nováky’s model and operationalization of concepts  
With the section above in mind, Nováky’s model will be modified in order to 
introduce adaption of national defence in the analytical model of this paper. As 
such, Nováky’s endogenous material variables will be used as material indicators 
of ‘adaption of national defence’. They are all important for the operational 
capacity of a EU country. Further, the exogenous material variables will be used 
as indicators of burden-sharing. However, both the indicators of adaption and 
burden-sharing, taken from Nováky’s model, will be complemented by two other 
indicators. First, adaption will be complemented with the indicator ‘priority of 
CSDP military operations’. More specifically, this indicator intends to analyse 
Sweden and Finland’s national defence planning and thereby see if CSDP military 
operations are prioritised in new defence developments or not.  Second, burden-
sharing will be complemented with ‘contribution of operational resources’. The 
motivations for these complements are based on the discussions above.  
                                                                                                                                                   
 
70 Petersen, Nikolaj (1998), ”National Strategies in the Integration Dilemma: An Adaptation Approach”, in 
Journal of Common Markets Studies, Vol. 36, nr 1, p. 33-42.  
  23 
 However, this means that Nováky’s immaterial variables, such as public 
opinion, threat perception, language of target country and relations with 
NATO/US will not be included in this study. Instead, adaption of national defence 
will constitute a new variable. In turn, this means that this paper will not include 
immaterial factors from four different levels of analysis. Instead, it will pay a 
central focus to one variable and thereby, reduce the risk of over-determination in 
the analysis.71 As such, this choice makes it possible to isolate just one factor and 
by that, analyse the importance of adaption more in-depth.  
 Against this background, Nováky’s model will be used to some extent in this 
paper. By changing his model however, the variables will be more possible to 
operationalize and also, the new variable is possible to examine. The figure below 
illustrates how Nováky’s model has been modified and complemented.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2: analytical model.  
 
Based on the discussion in this chapter, one hypothesis can be identified. As such, 
like mentioned in the introduction, a high degree of adaption is assumed to result 
in a high degree of burden-sharing. In contrast, a low degree of adaption of 
national defence assumes to result in a low degree of burden-sharing. More 
specific, since Sweden seems to have taken a higher degree of burden-sharing in 
operation Atalanta, in comparison to Finland, Sweden should also have adapted 
its national defence to a higher degree. Therefore, the expectation on Finland is 
that the country had only adapted its national defence to the EU framework to a 
low degree. The hypothesis is presented in the box on the next page.  
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H1: A high degree of adaption of national defence will result in a high degree of 
burden-sharing in CSDP military operations. 
 
 
2.6 Theoretical considerations  
As indicated above, the theoretical model of burden-sharing is embedded in the 
framework of FPA in this paper. The choice of this theory results in a delimitation 
of different factors, which are assumed to affect burden-sharing. As mentioned in 
the beginning of this chapter, this theory ‘opens up’ the state and thereby, it is 
possible to gain a deeper understanding of factors within Sweden and Finland. 
Further, the study is characterized by openness in the empirical analysis. As such, 
even if the hypothesis is that adaption affects burden-sharing, the outcome can be 
the following; adaption affect burden-sharing or adaption does not affect burden-
sharing. Thus, this paper intends also to analyse the intensity of the causal 
relationship between adaption and burden-sharing, if a such relationship is to be 
seen. Moreover, Nováky’s research has inspired the theoretical framework but 
instead of only using all of his variables, the aim of this study is to complement 
previous research and thereby shed light on the importance of the “D”-factor; 
adaption of national defence. The reason for choosing only one factor will be 
discussed more in the next chapter. As such, the factor ‘adaption of national 
defence’ assumes to be able to explain why the degree of burden-sharing were 
different between Sweden and Finland when they decided to contribute with 
resources to operation Atalanta.  
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3 Methodological framework 
This chapter will present the methodological framework that will be used in the 
empirical analyse. First, it will introduce the methodological points of departure. 
Second, it will examine different research strategies in the literature in order to be 
able to motivate the choise of the research strategy selected in this paper: a 
qualitative approach. Fourth, it will present the research design – a comparative 
case study. Fifth, the chapter will examine and discuss process tracing, a method 
often used in the framework of FPA. Finally, the chapter will reveal how data 
collections and materials are to be selected and how the factors will be 
operationalized. The final part will also provide a discussion of methodological 
considerations.  
3.1 Methodological points of departure  
The methodological points of departure of this paper is to study Sweden and 
Finland’s decision regarding their different degree of participation in operation 
Atalanta, within the theoretical framework of FPA. The study includes the 
decision-making process of operation Atalanta, and it will pay focus to the time 
period when Sweden and Finland contributed with resources. Further, the paper 
will also analyse adaption in a longer time perspective. The purpose of the paper 
determinates that the survey is an explanatory study with the intention to 
systematic analyse if adaption of national defence affected burden-sharing when 
the EU Member States realised operation Atalanta.  
 This study applies a qualitative method and a comparative case study design. 
Further, it intends to pay attention to the method of content analysis and process 
tracing.  As such, these methods are often used in order to analyse complex 
decision-making processes.  Noteworthy, this paper takes a positivistic approach, 
which implies that the unity of social science is knowable, due to the link between 
evidence and inference.72 
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3.2 Methods in social science  
Over the years in political science, a division between two methods have been 
developed: quantitative and qualitative methods. The main differences can be 
described as follows. Quantitative methods seek to show differences in number 
between certain objectives of analysis and qualitative methods seek to show 
differences in kind. Quantitative analysis represents and objects of comparison 
that can either be counted or assigned a numerical value. There are many such 
objects in political science today, for example, the method is often used when 
analysing democratic transitions or when analysing to which degree human rights 
are protected. As such, quantitative methods are based on the relationship that can 
be established between numeric variables using simple and advanced statistical 
methods.73 In contrast, qualitative methods seek to identify and understand the 
attributes and different characteristics of the objects of inquiry. The nature of the 
method therefore often requires a focus on small number of countries. As such, in 
qualitative method, there is no attempt to give numerical expression to the objects 
of inquiry. Instead, the goal is to provide well-rounded and complete discursive 
accounts.74  
However, indeterminate research designs are widespread in both quantitative 
and qualitative research. When quantitative research is indeterminate, statistical 
models may provide meaningless substantive conclusions. Regarding qualitative 
research, nothing so automatic as a computer program is available to discover 
indeterminate research designs.75 Even if both methods have their advantages and 
disadvantages, one may argue that qualitative researchers often have an advantage 
over quantitative methods. First, qualitative researchers have often enough 
information to do something to make their research designs determinate. Second, 
qualitative studies can analyse complex events to a higher degree and take into 
account numerous variables precisely because they do not require numerous cases 
or a restricted number of variables. Third, statistical methods lack accepted 
procedures for inductively generating new hypothesis.76 Moreover, King, 
Keohane and Verba also highlight that researchers should entail judgements of 
which phenomena that are ‘more’ or ‘less’ alike in degree of quantitative methods 
or in kind of qualitative methods.77 With awareness of the advantages of the 
quantitative method mentioned above, in combination with the fact that this paper 
intends to analyse two different countries - a number that is too low in order to use 
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quantitative methods - the qualitative approach seems to be more appropriate to 
use in this study.  
3.3 Research design 
As the last section made clear, there are different research methods in political 
science. However, since the qualitative approach is to be used, the next step is 
now to examine which research design that is most appropriate within this 
dimension. As such, qualitative research covers a wide range of approaches, but 
as indicated above, none of these approaches relies on numerical measurements.78 
Instead, this kind of work in the social sciences is often linked with case studies 
where the focus is on a particular event, decision, institution or a specific issue. 
Consequently, a particular place or event is analysed closely and in full detail.79 
Noteworthy, as operation Atalanta is of specific interest in this paper, a particular 
event, this concludes that this paper is a case study initially. Moreover, case 
studies can analyse qualitatively complex events and take numerous variables into 
account, because they do not require numerous cases or a restricted number of 
variables.  As such, case studies are not limited to test only variables that are 
already stated in previous research, they are often used in order to shed light on 
new variables.80 Noteworthy, since this study intends to test if a new variable, 
adaption, affects burden-sharing, this argument can illustrate another motive for 
using a case study in this paper.  
In turn, there are different designs of case studies: comparative research – 
including comparing many or few countries – and single country studies. 
However, several critiques of case study methods have converged into scepticism 
of the value of single case studies. Studies involving only a single observation are 
at great risk of indeterminacy in the face of more than one possible explanation, 
and they can lead to incorrect inferences if there is a measurement error.81 In 
contrast, previous research argues that comparative research is the best method for 
drawing inferences that are more generalizable. As such, comparing countries can 
lead to inferences that are better informed by the contextual specificities of the 
countries under scrutiny. Moreover, as different research designs also should be 
seen in relation to the specific research question,82 this paper intends to use a 
comparative case study in order to make appropriate inferences.  
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3.3.1 Comparative method and case selection  
Despite these more practical considerations above, the central distinction between 
different comparative methods depends on the key trade-off between the level of 
abstraction and the scope of countries being studied. Therefore, the inclusion of a 
large number of countries in a study results in a higher level of conceptual 
abstraction since concepts ‘travel’ across different contexts. In contrast, focus on 
one country or a few countries results in the use of less abstract concepts that are 
more grounded in a specific context under scrutiny. Moreover, comparing many 
countries is commonly referred to as ‘large-n’ comparison and comparing few 
countries is referred to ‘small-n’ comparison. Here, n is the number of countries.83  
However, there are both advantages and disadvantages by comparing many 
countries and comparing only a few countries. First, the main advantage of 
comparing many countries is the ability to use statistical controls to rule out rival 
explanations and control for cofounding factors and to make strong inferences that 
hold for more than one case. Thus, the main disadvantage of this method of 
comparison includes the validity of measures that are often crude approximations 
of social science. Moreover, many argue that this method is inappropriate for 
analysing complex causal mechanisms. Second, the main advantage with 
comparing only a few cases is that the method results in a deeper understanding of 
the problem analysed, as they are more intensive and less extensive since they 
compass more of the nuances specific to each country, as in this thesis. Thus, its 
disadvantage is the limited possibility to generalise.84  
However, with awareness of disadvantages and advantages of each 
comparative method, the aim of this paper is to analyse the decision making 
process in Sweden and Finland. This means that the study will be based on a 
comparative case study with the comparison of few countries. As such, the level 
of abstraction will be reduced but the selections of this method makes it possible 
to go deeper in the empirical analyse, which hopefully will provide in-depth 
knowledge of the importance of the variable ‘adaption of national defence’. 
In turn, within the comparative method, there are two types of research 
designs that the researcher can use in order to select cases; the Most Similar 
System Design (MSSD) and the Most Different System Design (MDSD). By 
using the MSSD, the researcher will select cases with different outcomes across 
similar countries. In contrast, by using the MDSD, the researcher will select cases 
with similar outcomes across different countries.85 As such, since Sweden and 
Finland can be argued to be two similar countries that participated to different 
degrees in operation Atalanta, this study applies the MSSD.  
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Moreover, for studies that compare few countries, like in this paper, selection 
of cases can seriously affect the type of inferences that are drawn. This problem is 
referred to as ‘selection bias’ in the literature and it arises from the intentional 
choice of countries. As such, researchers can choose to use random selection of 
cases or intentional selection of cases. Moreover, if authors choose random 
selection, selection without reflection, this may lead to serious problems of 
inference. In contrast, if authors choose intentional selection – this may lead to 
that the study only includes the cases that support a specific theory.86  
However, as this study has chosen Sweden and Finland for mainly two 
reasons, this means that this study uses an intentional selection of cases. The 
motives of the selection are as follows. First, Sweden and Finland differ in the 
dependent variable: different degrees of participation in operation Atalanta. 
Second, the two countries are similar in many aspects – none of them are member 
of NATO and both have applied a neutral history. As such, the cases have 
relevance to the research objective of the study. Noteworthy, the cases in this 
study have been selected on the dependent variable. Thus, according to Landman, 
this may lead either to an overestimation of effects that does not exist, or to an 
underestimation of effects that does exist.87  
However, there are solutions to the problem of choosing on the dependent 
variable; variance in the dependent variable, the cases will reflect substantive 
knowledge of parallel cases and the theory has specified certain outcomes and 
explanations.88 Moreover, these solutions can be found in this study. First, this 
paper has variance in the dependent variable  – different degrees of burden 
sharing. Second, the cases may produce knowledge of parallel cases since EU 
Member States intend to carry out CSDP military operations in the future and 
there will be the same Member States then, which have to share the burden of 
resources. Third, the theory of burden sharing has specified a more accurate range 
of countries in which certain outcomes and their explanations would obtain. 
Against this discussion, the selection of the two cases in this paper seems be 
justified in the literature.  
Based on the discussion above, this paper will use the method of structured, 
focused comparison. As such, by asking general questions that reflects the 
research objective of each case, Sweden and Finland will be compared and 
‘structured’ in the same manner. Further, the study will be ‘focused’ in that it 
deals with only certain aspects of Sweden and Finland; the actions of the two 
countries in operation Atalanta. The following questions will be used in this 
study: 
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• Which degree of burden-sharing did Sweden and Finland take in operation 
Atalanta? 
• Which degree of adaption of national defence did Sweden and Finland take in 
operation Atalanta? 
3.4 Data collection techniques and operationalization 
of concepts 
Since this study intends to examine how adaption of national defence can explain 
the different degrees of burden-sharing between Sweden and Finland when they 
decided to contribute with resources to operation Atalanta, this approach require 
us to think in terms of causes and effects. In order to illustrate a clear picture of 
this approach, one may refer to the explanation, in this paper adaption of national 
defence, as the independent variable. Moreover, one may refer to the ‘outcome’, 
in this paper the different degrees of burden-sharing, as the dependent variable.89 
As such, the figure below illustrates the direction of impact in the decision-
making process of operation Atalanta. Noteworthy, both the dependent variable 
and the independent variable in this paper has variance – both variables may take 
different values of ‘high’ or ‘low’.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3: independent and dependent variable.  
 
However, the case study method will be more effective if the research design 
includes a specification of the data to be obtained from the cases under study. As 
such, it is of importance to establish equivalence between the theoretical concepts 
that are used in a study and the operational indicators of those concepts.90 
Moreover, by evaluate the data collection method, this thesis strive to maximize 
the reliability91 of the measurements. In turn, by evaluate the methodological 
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operationalizations, the thesis strive to maximize the validity92 of the 
measurements. 
 As such, this paper will use two data collection methods in the empirical 
analyse, which intends to examine the independent and the dependent variable 
separately – in both Sweden and Finland. First, it will examine burden-sharing by 
using a qualitative content analysis. Second, it will examine adaption of national 
defence by the use of the method of process-tracing. The two sections below will 
present the methodological operationalization of the two concepts in this paper: 
burden-sharing and adaption. 
3.4.1 Burden-sharing 
As mentioned above, the theoretical operationalization of the concept of burden-
sharing is different degrees of participation, which is measured through EU 
Member States different resource contributions to CSDP military operations. 
Therefore, burden-sharing is measured in this paper by the operational resources 
that Sweden and Finland have contributed to operation Atalanta. However, in 
order to be able to evaluate if the contributions are high or low, Nováky’s research 
will be used to some extent.93 As such, Nováky’s  ‘material-exogenous variables’ 
will be examined but this paper will only pay focus to one of them: resources 
required for operation. According to Nováky, this variable can be divided in two 
variables: ‘profile of operation’ and ‘intensity of conflict’.  
Moreover, the examination of the dependent variable burden-sharing will be 
made in three steps. First, the intensity of the conflict will be examined. This is 
made by a rich description on how the international security problem maritime 
piracy has escalated since the 1990s. Further, it will be examined how the number 
of piracy attacks have increased. The analytical scheme for intensity of conflict is 
illustrated below. 
 
 
 
Intensity of conflict 
 
Escalation of maritime piracy  
Number of attacks  
 
 
                                                                                                                                                   
 
92 Validity refers to measuring what we think we are measuring (King, Gary, Keohane, Robert O., Verba, Sidney 
(1994), p. 25.  
93 Nováky, Niklas I. (2011).  
  32 
Second, the profile of operation Atalanta will be examined. The focus here is to 
identify the character of the conflict, mandate of mission, time period, 
international actors, task of the mission, availability of relevant forces, scarce 
resources and availability of financial resources.94 This is made by a rich 
description of operation Atalanta. The analytical scheme for profile of operation 
Atalanta is illustrated in the box below.  
 
 
Profile of operation Atalanta 
 
Character of conflict  
Mandate of the mission  
Time period  
Other international actors in the area  
Task of the mission  
Availability of relevant forces  
Scarce resources . 
Availability of financial resources  
 
Third, in order to be able to analyse Sweden and Finland’s different degrees of 
burden-sharing, the contributions of the two countries will be identified. The 
following three categories of operational resources will be examined: type of 
personnel,95 material and defence tasks. Note that both Sweden and Finland have 
also contributed in other ways to operation Atalanta, for example through 
humanitarian aid, but other contributions than operational resources and military 
personnel will not be included in this paper.96  
 
Operational resources Sweden Finland 
Type of personnel   
Material   
Defence tasks   
 
This three-step approach will make it possible to compare Sweden and Finland’s 
resources in relation to the whole operation. Specifically, the approach will 
identify if the contributions were critical to the realisation of operation Atalanta or 
not. As such, the degree of burden-sharing in Sweden and Finland will depend on 
if the national contributions was critical to the realisation of operation Atalanta or 
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not. As such, if Sweden or Finland have contributed with operational resources 
that are critical in the realisation of operation Atalanta, they take a high degree of 
burden-sharing. In contrast, if Sweden or Finland have not contributed with 
operational resources that are critical in the realisation with operation Atalanta; 
the countries take a low degree of burden-sharing. Noteworthy, due to the fact that 
the outcome of the decision-making process is already known, Sweden and 
Finland participated in different degrees, the dependent variable will either be 
high or low. As such, the dependent variable will not take the value ‘participated’ 
or ‘not participated’.  
 As mentioned above, burden-sharing is analysed by a qualitative content 
analysis, which is complemented by descriptive statistics. Content analysis is a 
method for making replicable and valid inferences from data to their context, with 
the purpose of providing new insights and a practical guide to action. The aim of 
the method is to attain a condensed and a broad description of the phenomenon 
studied.97 In order to examine burden-sharing, this paper will use different forms 
of secondary sources. It will use previous research regarding operation Atalanta, 
mainly from Panos Kautrako’s book The EU Common Security and Defence 
Policy” and Katarina Engberg’s book The EU and Military Operations. Further, it 
will use statistics from the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute 
(SIPRI), which reveals EU Member States operational contributions to EU 
missions. It will also use documents from the Swedish government.  
3.4.2 Adaption 
As mentioned above, the theoretical operationalization of the concept of adaption 
in this paper is based on ‘priority of CSDP military operations in national defence 
planning’, which assumes to determinate the operational capacity to participate 
for a EU Member State. However, in this paper, the independent variable adaption 
is measured in two steps. First, Nováky’s material-endogenous variables, 
economic resources and military resources, will be used as material indicators of 
adaption.98 These indicators will determinate the operational capacity to 
participate in Sweden and Finland. As such, if these material indicators take a 
high value – Sweden and Finland have a high operational capacity to participate 
in CSDP military operations. In contrast, if the indicators take a low value, 
Sweden and Finland have a low operational capacity to participate in CSDP 
military missions. In order to analyse this first step of adaption, descriptive 
statistic will be used. As such, the data collection method will be ‘rich 
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description’ of the first part of adaption, which means to infer information about 
unobserved facts.99  
Second, these more material indicators of adaption will be complemented by 
the priority CSDP military operations have been given in national defence 
planning and reforms. This variable will be analysed by using the techniques of 
process-tracing. As such, this data collection method makes it possible to identify 
the intervening causal process between adaption and burden-sharing.100 The key 
in this method is to analyse a chain of events that leads to a specific outcome in 
the end and in this process, find crucial moments. More specific, researchers 
should identify partial decisions that are made by decision-makers.101   
The figure below shows the analytical scheme that will be used in the 
empirical analyse. In total, there are six indicators of adaption but it is the priority 
of CSDP military operations in national defence reforms that are of high 
importance in the empirical analyse.  
 
Indicators of adaption Sweden Finland 
Size of defence budget   
Size of defence expenditure   
Number of deployable forces    
Professional forces/conscription102   
Existing deployments   
Priority of CSDP military operations in 
national defence reforms 
  
 
 
When using the method of process-tracing in an comparative case study, there is 
no limitation when it comes to which material researchers can use. As such, every 
material that can give the smallest hint about causal mechanisms that could have 
been present in the specific decision-making process, are to be used.103 This paper 
will use both primary and secondary sources. The primary sources will consist of 
official documents like government bills, reforms and reports of security and 
defence policy in Sweden and Finland. This will be complemented by secondary 
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sources and defence statistics from the European Defence Agency (EDA). More 
specific, Pernille Rieker’s research will be used in order to examine adaption.104  
Moreover, Sweden and Finland have adapted their national defence if the 
majority of the material indicators change to a higher value during the referent 
period and if CSDP military operations are given a central role in national defence 
planning. In contrast, Sweden and Finland have not adapted their national defence 
if the majority of the material indicators change to a lower value during the 
referent period and if CSDP military operations only are given a limited role in 
national defence planning. 
3.4.3 Selected time periods  
As mentioned in the introduction of this paper, operation Atalanta was launched 
in December 2008 and it is still ongoing. In time of writing, the operation is 
intended to continue to December 2016.105 Thus, it is not the political decision in 
2008, when the Union decided to realise operation Atalanta that is being of 
interest in this paper. Instead, in this thesis, there will be two referent periods – 
one for burden-sharing and the first part of adaption, and one for the second part 
of adaption. This choice is motivated by the fact that it is important to analyse 
Sweden and Finland’s operational capacity exclusively during their time of 
contributions to operation Atalanta. Further, adaption of national defence assumes 
to be a factor that is developed over a long time period and therefore, this factor 
needs an extended referent period.  
Sweden has contributed to the operation three times with resources: in 2009, 
in 2010 and in 2013.106 Sweden will also contribute with resources in 2015107 but 
since the whole year is not possible to examine, this year will not be included in 
the analysis. Finland contributed with resources in 2011 and 2013108 (see 
appendix 3). As such, the first referent period, in order to examine burden-sharing 
and the first part of adaption, will be 2009-2013. The national defence in both 
Sweden and Finland started to change after the Cold War. Since then, there have 
been national defence reforms in the two countries, which are of importance in 
this thesis. Therefore, the second referent period, in order to examine the second 
part of adaption - ‘priority of CSDP military operations’ - will be 1990-2013.  
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Factors 
 
 
Selected time period 
Burden-sharing 
 
2009-2013 
Adaption: 
 
 
Material indicators 2009-2013 
Priority of CSDP military operations 1990-2013 
3.5 Methodological considerations  
The general challenge to overcome, when it comes to the study of social science, 
is an indeterminable research design – when the researcher use too many variables 
and two few countries. However, this study applies different solutions to the 
problem. First, this study uses variance in both the independent and the dependent 
factor, which raises the number of observations. Second, this study uses the 
MSSD, which seeks to control for those factors that are similar across countries in 
the study. Third, this study uses only one key explanatory variable, which intends 
to explain ‘a lot with a little’.109 At best, according to King, Keohane and Verba, 
the goal is just this: to use a single explanatory variable to explain numerous 
observations on dependent variables.110  
Moreover, one may notice other challenges when it comes to the study of 
social science and more specific, case studies. First, by intentionally limiting the 
number of countries under comparison, the case study method sacrifices in some 
degree the broad generalization possibilities.111 As such, the specific 
understanding of adaption in Sweden and Finland is difficult to examine in other 
countries. Second, when it comes to measure if one variable affect another, 
spuriousness may occur. As such, some unidentified factors may be responsible 
for the outcome.112  
However, methods of social science demonstrate that we can never hope to 
know a causal effect for certain. This is a fundamental problem since no matter 
how perfect the research design is, no matter how much data we collect, no matter 
how perceptive the observer is and no matter how much experimental control we 
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have; researchers will never know a causal inference for certain.113 Thus, even if 
the possibility of coming up with a faultless method is limited in social science, 
this study assumes that the chosen method in this paper will result in a stimulating 
inference and thereby, contribute to the academic field.  
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4 Empirical Analysis   
This chapter will present the empirical analysis of this paper. First, the chapter 
will provide a brief oversight of the EU’s capability targets and operational 
demands, in order for the reader to know the relationship between the Union and 
its Member States in the sphere of security- and defence policy. Second, the 
dependent variable ‘burden-sharing’ will be examined in first Sweden and then 
Finland. This is followed by a comparative discussion in order to examine the 
degrees of burden-sharing in the two countries. Third, the independent variable, 
‘adaption of national defence,’ will be examined in the same way – first in 
Sweden and then in Finland. This is also followed by a comparative discussion, 
which examines the degree of adaption in the two countries.  
4.1 EU capability targets and operational demands 
The European Council meeting in Helsinki in December 1999 defined what came 
to be known as the Helsinki Headline Goal, a military capability goal Member 
States tried to implement by the end of 2003. The goal stated that by the year of 
2003, by cooperating together voluntarily, the EU Member States would be able 
to deploy rapidly and sustain force capable of the full range of the Petersberg 
tasks – including the most demanding operations. Moreover, the European 
Security Strategy (ESS) was established in 2003, which still provides the overall 
political guidance for EU’s planning for civilian missions and military operations. 
The EU is supposed to constitute a ‘force for good’ and to contribute to solving 
and thus keeping conflicts away from Europe.114  
 However, 2003 came and went, and even if obvious capability gaps persisted in 
the Union, Member States presented a new goal in May 2004. This time, the 
Headline Goal 2010 was introduced. Through this goal, member capitals 
committed themselves to being able to respond with rapid action to the whole 
spectrum of crisis management operations – covered by the Treaty on the 
European Union. To achieve the objectives, the European Capabilities Action 
Plan (ECAP) was created in 2001. This project compromised 19 project groups, 
which were supposed to help EU Member States reach their capability goals. 
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Moreover, in 2004, the creation of the European Defence Agency was also set in 
order to promote national military capabilities.115   
The political guidelines of the ESS were updated in 2009 and have been translated 
into possible missions and operations in the form of the Petersberg tasks – 
mentioned above. In article 43(1) in the Treaty of Lisbon, they are stated in their 
own form:116  
 
“The tasks referred to in Article 42(1), in the course of which the Union may use civilian and 
military means, shall include joint disarmaments operations, humanitarian and resource tasks, 
military advice and assistance tasks, conflict prevention and peace-keeping tasks, tasks to combat 
forces in crisis management, including peace-making and post-conflict stabilisation.”117   
 
The EU’s prime military instruments today consists of a stabilisation force of 
some 50.000-60.000 personnel and the Rapid Response Force of two EU Battle 
Groups (EU BG) of 1,500 persons. The stabilisation force is complemented with 
air and maritime forces and command and control structures. This force shall be 
available within ten days after a political decision. The force shall also have a 
sustainability of four months. Both different forces are meant to be able to 
interact: with the EU BG serving as a bridging force. This means that this group 
can halt the escalation of a conflict while the stabilisation force will be used in a 
later time frame of the event.118 
4.2 Burden-sharing 
This section intends to first examine the intensity of the conflict in operation 
Atalanta, i.e. the intensity of the maritime piracy. Second, it will provide a rich 
description of the profile of operation Atalanta and it will summarize the main 
findings in a table. Third, it will present which specific operational resources 
Sweden and Finland contributed with to the mission. Finally, it will present the 
comparative discussion, which specifies if the countries take a high or low degree 
of burden-sharing.  
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Intensity of conflict 
Maritime piracy119 around the Horn of Africa, and more specific in Somalia’s 
coastal waters, is an international security problem and it has existed for decades. 
The earliest report goes back to the 1950s but it started to get more serious in the 
1980s. Many researchers have highlighted that the roots of the problem is the fact 
that Somalia has been without an effective government since the civil war and 
therefore, local administrators have been able to control parts of its coastal 
waters.120  
 In the 1990s, the security problem continued to receive relatively little 
international attention due to the relatively low frequencies of attacks. More 
specific, the highest numbers of attacks in Somalia waters were recorded in 1994 
and 1999 when 14 ships were attacked during both years.121  
 However, during the first half of the 2000s, the number of pirate attacks in 
Somalia’s waters continued to grow and the regional focus started to shift: from 
Somalia’s Indian Ocean coast to the Gulf of Aden. Noteworthy, this narrow sea 
passage is one of the world’s busiest shipping routes and a significant corridor for 
transporting fossil fuels from the Persian Gulf to Europe.122 The figure below 
shows a picture of the region.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                   
 
119 According to the UN Monitoring Group on Somalia, pirates are described as ’sea robbers’: ’passengers or 
crew members of private vessels who commit armed robberies of commercial vessels in seaports and teritorial 
waters’. Source: United Nations, ”Report of the Monitoring Group on Somalia pursuant to Security Council 
resolution 1630 (2005), p. 25.  
120 Nováky, Niklas (2012), ”Deploying Military Force Under CSDP: The Case of EU NAVFOR Atalanta”, 
University of Aberdeen, Presented by the 2012 UACES Annual Conference in Passau, p. 6-9.   
121 Ibid, p. 6-9.  
122 Ibid, p. 6-9.  
  41 
Moreover, in 2006, the international community started to effort to manage the 
growing problem of piracy through the UN but the number of pirate attacks 
reached a new peak in 2007. This year, 51 attacks were made. In the beginning of 
2007, two WFP vessels were hijacked by Somali pirates resulting in the death of 
one security guard on board. These attacks stated that it was now increasingly 
difficult for the WFP to find contractors willing to take the high risks of sailing to 
Somalia.123  
 As such, since the problem of maritime piracy increased over time and the 
attacks got more serious, the intensity of the conflict required the international 
community to take action to guarantee the safety of WFP vessels to Somalia.  
 
Profile of operation Atalanta  
Operation Atalanta has been one of the most high-profile CSDP military 
operations in the EU. The operation has not only been the first, and so far only, 
naval operation undertaken by the Union but it has also been tackling a problem 
which has gain attention over the last few years: piracy. Two dimensions of this 
problem can be seen. First, the financial costs of piracy are considered significant 
for the maritime industry. According to the organization One Earth Future 
Foundation, the cost of Somali piracy has so far been estimated to somewhere 
between 7-12 billion dollars.  Second, piracy is closed linked to organized crimes 
and terrorism. Noteworthy, the problem of piracy has contributed to the long and 
brutal civil war in Somali – which has effectively destroyed all structures of the 
central government.  
 The emerging significance of piracy is recognized by the Union. In the 
Security Strategy, from 2003, the EU highlights piracy as a new dimension of 
organized crime. Only five years later, in 2008, the Union underlines piracy as 
one of the main issues in its effort to build stability in Europe.124   
 In 2008, the United Nation’s Security Council invited States and regional 
organizations to act in order to protect shipping involved with the transportation 
and delivery of humanitarian aid to Somalia. Only two weeks after the conference, 
the UN adopted Resolution 1816, which authorized States acting in cooperation 
with the Somalia Government – to fight against piracy and armed robbery at sea 
off the coast of Somalia. Later the same year, the UN adopts Resolution 1838, 
where it mentions specifically the possibility of a EU maritime operation. The 
Resolution calls upon States to take part in the fight against piracy, in particular 
by deploying naval vessels and military aircraft in accordance with international 
law.125  
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 Before the EU deployed a naval force, the Union decided to set up a military 
cell in Brussels, which intended to coordinate the involvement of certain Member 
States, which had been providing protection to the WFP’s vessels. Two months 
later, the Council adopted the Joint Action 2008/851/CFSP, which set out the 
parameters of Operation Atalanta.126  
 As mentioned before, the operation was launched in December 2008, and it 
was initially scheduled for one year. However, on 8 December 2009, the Council 
of the EU decided to extend its mandate for another year – until December 2010. 
Since the operation is still going on, there were two more times when operation 
Atalanta was extended. On 23 March 2012, the Council of the EU extended the 
mandate of operation Atalanta until December 2014. At the same time, the 
Council also extended the Area of Operation to also include Somali coastal 
territory and internal waters.127 Further, on 21 November 2014, the Council of the 
EU extended the Mandate of Operation Atalanta once again, until December 
2016.128  
 The Operational Headquarters (OHQ) is in Northwood UK, and the Force 
Command is abroad ships in the area. The operation compromises approximately 
1,400 military personnel. The tasks of the UN-mandate Operation EUNAVFOR 
Atalanta were formulated to provide the following: 
 
1. The deterrence, prevention and repression of acts of piracy and armed robbery 
off the coast of Somalia.  
2. The protection of WFP vessels delivering food aid to displaced persons and 
protection of African Union Mission on Somalia shipping.  
3. The protection of vulnerable shipping off the Somali coast on a case-by-case 
basis.  
4. A contribution to the monitoring of fishing activities off the Somali coast.129  
 
However, the EU’s naval operation Atalanta is not the only counter-piracy 
operation off the coast of Somalia. In fact, a number of international initiatives 
have been undertaken: NATO has been active through Operation Ocean Shield 
and the United States have been leading Combined Maritime Forces. Moreover, a 
number of individual states maintain vessels patrolling the area: China, India, 
Russia and Japan. Some Member States participate in some of these initiatives in 
addition to EUNAVFOR.130  
 It is worth noting that operation Atalanta had rather limited resources in order 
to fight the piracy off the coast of Somalia; no more than seven vessels and four 
planes. The area of the operation covers the extremely broad zone comprising the 
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south of the Red Sea, the Gulf of Aden and part of the Indian Ocean, including the 
Seychelles. This area has the same size as the Mediterranean Sea or ten times the 
size of Germany.131  
 Moreover, the contributions of naval forces offered by Member States did not 
correspond to one-quarter of the resources necessary to cover the area o the 
operation. Sea surveillance aircrafts and coast guard’s capability provided to be 
particularly scarce resources.132 The profile of operation Atalanta is illustrated in 
the figure below. The next section will examine specific which resources Sweden 
and Finland contributed with to operation Atalanta.  
 
 
Profile of operation Atalanta 
 
Character of conflict Naval, anti-piracy operation 
Mandate of the mission UN 
Time period 
2008-ongoing 
 
Other international actors in the area 
NATO, US, Russia, China, India 
 
Task of the mission 
Humanitarian, protection of WFP’s 
vessels 
Availability of relevant forces 7 vessels and four planes  
Scarce resources 
Coast guard capabilities and sea 
surveillance aircraft. 
Availability of financial resources Obtained by the Athena mechanism. 
4.2.1 Sweden’s contributions  
As mentioned in the previous chapter, Sweden has made three decisions regarding 
contribution of operational resources to operation Atalanta: in 2009, in 2010 and 
in 2013. In 2009, Sweden contributed with two corvettes: HMS Stockholm and 
HMS Malmö. Sweden contributed also with the support vessel HMS Trossö and a 
specially trained protection force from the Amphibious Corps. The total crew and 
personnel contribution consisted of 150 persons. HMS Trossö completed five 
escorts of WFP’s vessels and it escorted also other merchant ships that had been 
granted protection in the region.133  
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In 2010, Sweden was in charge of the command of the Force Headquarters of 
operation Atalanta. The operation was led from HMS Carlskrona, which also 
entailed ship-based helicopters. The Swedish coast guard contributed with air 
patrols, which were based on the Seychelles with the task to document and report 
suspicious piracy activity.134 In 2011, Sweden contributed also with five officers 
to the OHQ in Northwood (UK).135  
In 2013, Sweden contributed with HMS Carlskrona. In the first part of the 
year, the Swedish Coast Guard contributed also with air-patrols.136  The Swedish 
contributions to operation Atalanta during the referent period in this paper are 
summarised in the figure below.   
 
Contribution of operational 
resources 
Sweden 
Type of personnel 
• Crew  
• Officers to OHQ 
 
 
Material 
• HMS Stockholm (corvette) 
• HMS Malmö (corvette) 
• HMS Trossö (support vessel) 
• HMS Carlskrona (warship) 
• Air patrols  
Defence tasks 
• Escort WFP’s vessels 
• Document piracy activity 
4.2.2 Finland’s contributions  
As mentioned in the previous chapter, Finland contributed two times to operation 
Atalanta. In 2009, Finland decided to contribute with 10 persons to the operation, 
one officer to the OHQ and one officer was based on-board of the leader vessel. In 
February 2011, Finland contributed with the mine vessel FNS Pohjanmaa, which 
is the flagship of the Finnish army. In 2013, Finland also contributed with an 
independent vessel protection division with crew strength of 25 persons. 
Noteworthy, this was the first time the Finnish Navy participated in an 
international naval military operation with a warship.137 The Finnish contributions 
are summarised in the figure below.  
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Contribution of operational 
resources 
Finland 
Type of personnel 
• Crew  
• Officers to OHQ 
• Officer to the leading vessel 
Material 
• FNS Pohjanmaa (mine vessel) 
• (Independent vessel protection division) 
 
Defence tasks 
 
• Escort WFP’s vessels 
 
4.2.3 Comparative analysis   
As mentioned in the first part of this section, the intensity of the conflict – in this 
case piracy activity has escalated during the last years. As such, the numbers of 
piracy attacks have increased and Somali pirates have hijacked two WFP vessels. 
This development can be interpreted as a high intensity of the conflict in Somalia, 
which in turn requires resources that can handle this type of resistance in a EU 
operation. Moreover, the resources needed are specific war and corvette vessels. It 
should be mentioned that these specific resources could be a challenge for each 
EU Member State to come up with. As an example, some Member States have 
only a small marine and others doesn’t have a marine at all; like Austria - for 
geographical reasons.    
This high intensity of the conflict in Somalia is also to be seen when it comes 
to the ‘profile of operation Atalanta’. In 2003, the EU highlighted piracy as a new 
dimension of organized crime, and only five years later – piracy was seen as the 
main issue in efforts to build stability in Europe. Remarkable, since the Union 
recognize piracy as such a central problem, it can be questioned why not a higher 
number of EU Member States contributed to operation Atalanta with war vessels. 
Accordingly, one reason could be the one discussed above, not all EU member 
States have a marine. However, Member States could have contributed with other 
resources – like their Coast Guard.  
Further, the fact that operation Atalanta was based on an UN mandate can be 
seen as particularly important for EU Member States, which have a long tradition 
of acting within the UN in order to promote peace at the international arena. As 
such, this specific part of the profile can be seen as a fundamental part for some 
countries in order to take part of a EU military mission.     
Another reflection that regards the specific profile of Atalanta is the fact that 
the time period of the operation has been extended three times. Moreover, if a 
higher number of Member States had contributed with more resources - the need 
to extend the operation would maybe not be present. In line with this, it can also 
be mentioned that the only goal for the operation was not to escort WFP vessels. 
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A central part of the first goal was also to prevent acts of piracy. As such, EU 
Member States that did not have specific resources in terms of war vessels or 
corvettes could have been contributing with documentation of piracy by sending a 
report team.  
When comparing Sweden and Finland’s contribution of resources and its 
relevance for the whole operation, one may conclude that Sweden did take a 
higher degree of burden-sharing in operation Atalanta than Finland did. This can 
be motivated by the following discussion.  
First, Sweden contributed with scare resources, such like coast guard 
capabilities and sea surveillance aircraft. Due to the naval profile of the operation, 
these were resources that were of high importance to the mission but no other 
country offered this kind of assets. Second, Sweden contributed with corvette 
vessels. As such, due to the high intensity of the conflict and the high number of 
attacks, the operation seemed to demand combat ship from the EU Member 
States. Third, it can also be mentioned that Sweden contributed with resources 
from the very start of the mission. In contrast, Finland contributed after two years 
of practice. Fourth, Sweden documented and reported suspicious piracy activity, 
which can be seen as a way of meeting the goals of operation Atalanta in a higher 
way. 
Moreover, Finland’s low degree of burden-sharing in comparison to Sweden 
can be based on further motivations. First, the country did only contributed with a 
mine vessel: FNS Pohjanmaa. As such, since the Finnish marine has other 
different categories of vessels, one option could be to send more than just one or 
send another category of ship. Second, Finland decided to send an independent 
vessel protection. This means that the country preferred to act outside the Union 
and thereby, it did not bear their burden of the collective EU force. In addition, 
like mentioned above, Finland could have contributed with other resources in 
order to take a higher degree of burden-sharing. Against this background, Sweden 
did take a high degree of burden-sharing in operation Atalanta. In contrast, 
Finland took a low degree of burden-sharing. On the next page, the table 
summarises the contributions of Sweden and Finland.  
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Contribution of 
operational 
resources 
Sweden Finland 
 
Type of 
personnel 
 
• Crew 
• Officers to OHQ 
• Crew  
• Officers to 
OHQ 
• Officer to 
the leading 
vessel 
 
 
 
 
Material 
• HMS Stockholm 
(corvette) 
• HMS Malmö 
(corvette) 
• HMS Trossö 
(support vessel) 
• HMS Carlskrona 
(warship) 
• Air patrols  
• FNS 
Pohjanmaa 
(mini 
vessel) 
• (Independe
nt vessel 
protection 
division) 
 
Defence tasks 
• Escort WFP’s 
vessels 
• Document piracy 
activity 
 
• Escort 
WFP’s 
vessels 
4.3 Adaption of national defence  
This section will first discuss the material indicators of adaption of national 
defence. The indicators will be summarised in tables, for both Sweden and 
Finland. Second, the priority of CSDP military operations in national defence 
reforms will be examined separately: first in Sweden and then in Finland. Finally, 
a comparative analysis is made in order to examine to what degree Sweden and 
Finland have adapted their national defence.  
4.3.1 Material indicators 
Sweden and Finland 
At the end of the Cold War, European countries cut, sometimes radically, their 
defence budgets. Since the region was faced with peace, heads of state and 
government thought that they could benefit from the new condition and as such, 
they could reallocate precious resources to other areas of public spending which 
were electorally more promising. Moreover, European countries spent, in average, 
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3.1 percent of their Gross Domestic Product (GDP) on defence between 1985 and 
1989. In 2008, this figure had fallen to 1.7 percent.138  
 In addition, the budgetary crisis in Europe resulted in another reduction in 
national defence budgets in Europe. In 2010, the main Member States of the EU 
made major cuts to their defence budgets as an emergency measure. Noteworthy, 
in 2011, the UK reduced its defence budget by 8 percent. France made cuts 
equivalent to 3.5 billion euro between 2011 and 2013, after having got rid of 
54,000 jobs within its armed forces. In states such as Spain, Ireland and Portugal 
and even countries from central and Eastern Europe, the situation was even 
worse.139  
 However, the CSDP had led to that some countries, such as Sweden, actually 
have increased their defence spending. More specific, in 2009, Sweden’s defence 
budget was close to 4,47 million euros.140 In 2013, Sweden’s defence budget was 
close to 4,62 million euros.141 Thus, as indicated above, the majority of the 
European countries reduced their defence spendings. As such, in contrast to 
Sweden, Finland’s defence budget was 2.8 million euros 2009142 and in 2013, it 
was 2.4 million euros.143 
 Moreover, planned expenditure remained roughly constant in the relatively 
healthy economies of Northern Europe, such as Sweden, between 2010-2013. 
Thus, real defence expenditure in 2012 fell in Finland with 3.5 percent but there 
was a nominal increase in 2013 as procurement funding was boosted to finance 
the purchase of the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter (fighter aircraft).144. The defence 
expenditure in Sweden increased with 1122 million euros from 2009 to 2012. In 
Finland, the defence expenditure increased with 171 million euros during the 
same period.145  
 In the early 1990’s, defence planners allowed the Union to assume more 
responsibility for new crisis management missions. In 1992, the ‘Petersberg 
Tasks’ were introduced, which implied radical transformation of the EU’s existing 
capacity to provide deployable, professional intervention forces geared to ‘out-of-
area’ crisis management. The first step in the transformation process was for the 
EU Member States to end conscription and to move towards all-volunteer forces. 
As such, conscripts tended to have limited training and skills and therefore, in 
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combination with political and juridical reasons, it was generally recognized that 
it produced un-deployable personnel outside of their home countries. France and 
Spain decided to abolish conscription in 1996 after agonizing debates about the 
connection between military service and democracy. In 2001, in both states, the 
last conscripts left the armed forces. Since then, further 17 EU Member States 
have abolished conscription.146  
 Noteworthy, Sweden ‘suspended’ the draft during peacetime, which implies 
that Sweden changed from conscription to voluntary forces in 2010. In contrast, 
only six EU Member States out of 28 are still basing their defence on 
conscription, among them Finland. The motivations for abolishing conscription 
varied between the different Member States. Some sought to reduce their military 
budgets, while others like France and Germany were intent to increase deployable 
forces for over seas crisis management. The motivations for not abolish 
conscription are in general related to countries desire to be able to protect their 
national territory against other actors.147  
 However, even if the majority of the EU Member States have abolish 
conscription today, with the motivation to increase the number of deployable 
troops to out-of-area crisis missions, statistics from the European Defence Agency 
(EDA) indicates that land forces available for sustainable deployments has 
decreased from 125,000 in 2008 to 106,000 in 2010. Moreover, active duty forces 
deployed on crisis management operations by EU Member States had fallen from 
68,000 troops in 2006 to 49,000 in 2011. As such, the number deployed on 
operations has decreased faster than the total number of active service 
personnel.148 Regarding deployable forces, Finland belongs to the majority of the 
EU Member States: its number of active personnel has been reduced from 29,300 
in 2009149 to 22,200 in 2013.150 This is a reduction with 7100 persons. In contrast, 
Sweden does not belong to the majority. As such, Sweden has increased its 
deployable forces from 16,900 in 2009151 to 20,500 in 2013.152 This is an increase 
with 3600 persons. Further, according to EDA statistics, Sweden had 1000 
existing deployments in 2009 and 693 in 2013. Finland had 670 existing 
deployments in 2009 and the country had 357 2013.153 All the material indicators 
are summarized in both countries bellow.  
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Sweden 2009 2012 2013 Change 
Defence budget (million) €4,47  €4,62  + €0,13 
Defence expenditure 
(million) 
€3510  €4632  
 
 
+€1122  
Deployable forces (active) 16,900  20, 500 +3600 
Professional forces Yes  Yes Yes 
Conscription Yes  No Yes 
Existing deployments154 1000 693  -307 
 
 
Finland 2009 2012 2013 Change 
Defence budget (million) €2.8   €2.4  -€0,4  
Defence expenditure 
(million) 
€2686  €2857   +€171 
Deployable forces (active) 29.300  22.200 -7100 
Professional forces No  No No 
Conscription Yes  Yes No 
Existing deployments155 670 357  -313 
 
Noteworthy, the majority of the material indicators in Sweden have changed to a 
higher value during the referent period. In contrast, the majority of the indicators 
have changes to a lower value in Finland.  
4.3.2 Priority of CSDP in national defence planning  
Sweden 
During the cold war, Sweden followed a policy of ‘military non-alignment¨. This 
meant that the country did not take part in military alliances in peacetime – ‘in 
order to remain neutral in the event of war in its neighbourhood’. The policy was 
based on armed forces designed to be strong enough to deter an enemy from 
attacking. Moreover, the Swedish Armed Forces (SAF) could, after mobilization, 
consist of 800 000 men and women. A central factor at this time was the relatively 
huge defence industrial sector - and the SAF had weapon with a ‘Swedish profile’. 
These weapons was specially adapted to be used by soldiers with only a little 
training and, in order to secure the policy of military non-alignment, they were 
designed not to be interoperable with those of other countries.  
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However, Sweden did take part of peacekeeping operations, within the UN, 
but this engagement was seen as a sideshow by the Swedish military.156  When 
Sweden joined the EU, it started to change its security policy by put more 
emphasis on the country’s international commitments in security questions. In 
1998, the Swedish government proposed to undertake a major qualitative reform 
of its national defence forces and even if Sweden explicitly referred to the ESDP 
process as the main reasons for this, many researchers do shed light on the fact 
that NATO did also push for changes.157  
However, since both neutrality and a credible independent national defence 
have been central bases in Sweden’s security strategy, it was important to 
establish national consensus before some radical changes were made. Therefore, 
the Swedish government decided in 1994 to create a permanent commission, 
which consisted of representatives of the Government and the Parliament. The 
aim was to consult the new development of Swedish defence and security policy 
and the group was named ‘the Swedish Defence Commission’.158  
In 1995, the same year Sweden joined the EU; the Defence Commission 
presented a report – which highlighted that Sweden should give priority to conflict 
prevention and crisis management. Further, European integration was seen as an 
important part of Swedish security policy: 
 
“It is in Sweden’s security interest to concretely contribute to peace and security 
and by the use of its defence resources, both military and civilian, participate in 
international peace support and humanitarian operations”.159  
 
This report represents the first significant changes in Sweden’s defence policy 
after the Cold war: the need for more emphasis on Swedish international 
commitments than on the tradition of national territorial defence.160 Moreover, the 
new emphasis on the European dimension becomes also evident in the annual 
declarations of Swedish foreign policy. In the declaration of 1999, which was 
presented just after the St Mâlo summit, the following was stated: 
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“The Government wants to strengthen Europe’s crisis management capability. 
With its breadth and community of values, the EU has great potential in this 
area.”161  
 
This recognition of European military capacity resulted in other national reforms 
in Sweden’s defence policy. As such, the defence decision in 1996 stated that 
Sweden’s capacity for participation in peace-promoting activities must be 
enhanced and that participation in these operations is to be regarded as one of the 
main tasks of the total defence authorities.162  
 However, one of the biggest transformation of Swedish defence policy started 
to take place in 1999 when the defence Commission proposed the ‘review report 
for security and defence policy’. The report emphasised the need for a higher 
priority of crisis management capability,163 and states in line with the previous 
report that Sweden should contribute to the collective security in Europe: 
 
“Our security and prosperity is to a high degree dependent on developments 
abroad and in cooperation with other countries. This dependence grows 
gradually and underlines the importance of joint responsibility for peace and 
security in Europe and Sweden should contribute to this”.164  
 
Based on the advice from the Commission presented the Swedish government a 
proposal for major defence reforms in November 1999, which were approved by 
the ‘Riksdag’ in March 2000.  The decision represented a clear move to smaller 
and more flexible forces ready to meet a broad spectrum of challenges. Thereby, 
the move away from territorial defence was one again illustrated.165  
 
“The international development in the last decade has shown that crisis can 
develop fast and result in far-reaching consequences. Thereby highlights the need 
to have the capacity to be able to take part of international crisis management 
missions”.166  
  
Noteworthy, in order for Sweden to participate in crisis management operations, 
an UN mandate was required until 2001. As such, the Government suggested that 
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year a change of this practice. This change made participation possible even in the 
absence of a mandate from the UN.167  
 In June 2004, the Defence Commission presented another new proposals on 
‘defence for a new time’, which suggested that it should be possible to reduce the 
SAF significantly. At the same time, the report clearly stated that Sweden should 
increase its contributions gain to international crisis management operations.168 
Moreover, the government bill ‘Our Future defence’ presented later in 2004 
further reforms aimed at transforming the military forces in Sweden. As such, the 
defence should be transformed from a ‘defence force against invasion’ to a 
‘mobile, flexible operational defence’ and it should involve ‘radical 
transformation both in terms of size and structure’.169 As a result, the military 
defence in Sweden was to be organized into units and systems suitable for defence 
and operating as part of international missions.170  
 In 2009, a new Government bill was handed over to the Swedish parliament. 
The document suggested major changes in the national defence system, primarily 
due to the abolition of conscription in peacetime. As such, the provision of 
personnel should instead be based on voluntariness, which was considered to 
promote a greater availability for the Swedish defence. As a result, the operational 
capacity was central to promote in order for the Swedish defence to be able to fast 
respond to international crises through its engagement in the EU.  
 
“The defence should be able to use here and now, and it should increasingly 
contribute both to the security of Sweden but also to the stability in the world. 
Through increased operational availability and flexibility will the defence be 
better equipped to meet crises and conflicts, even when they arise at a short 
notice.”171  
 
In May 2013, the Defence Commission presented a new defence report ‘Choices 
in a globalised world’. The Commission presented its assessment of security 
policy developments and related impacts on Swedish defence policy. In the report, 
it is clear that a strong European co-operation with the EU is at heart of the 
Swedish defence and that international cooperation is crucial:172  
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“European unity, as well as a united, clear and principled European foreign 
policy, is of central importance for our ability to meet challenges against our 
security.”173 
 
When the Ministry of Defence in Sweden presented their security policy report  
‘The Defence of Sweden – stronger defence for a uncertain time’ in 2014, the 
report from the Defence Commission formed a central base.174 As such, it is also 
clear in this report that the participation in international crisis management 
missions it central in the defence of Sweden.175 Further, the major changes of the 
defence in the last decades have given Sweden the operational capacity to take 
part of EU military operations.   
 
Finland 
In the 1980’s, the European integration process accelerated. As such, since the 
relations between the European Free Trade Association (EFTA) and the European 
Community (EC) become deeper, it was important for Finland to establish closer 
ties to the EC in order to avoid becoming sidelined in international politics. Thus, 
due to the fact that Finland recognised an ‘active neutral’ policy during this time, 
co-operation was only possible in economic terms.176 However, when the Single 
European Act (SEA) was signed in 1985, foreign and security political co-
operation become an integral part of the EC. Thus, the Finnish government 
underlined in a declaration that no significant changes had taken place in Finnish 
policies and that it continued to endorse the traditional element of an neutral 
policy.177   
The dissolution of the Soviet Union in December 1991 paved the way for a 
new security policy doctrine in Finland. The Friendship Co-operation and Mutual 
Assistance Treaty (FCMA) between Finland and Soviet was replaced by a treaty 
of good neighbourly relations with Russia, and therefore, the primary framework 
in terms of which neutrality had been practised had disappeared. Thus, even if this 
new context made it possible to increase international co-operation, national 
security issues was still important in the Finnish security policy. As such, even if 
Russia was no longer regarded as a threat to Finland’s sovereignty, the traumas of 
the past had left traces in foreign policy thinking that were not easy to erase. In 
addition, the fact that the long joint border with Russia was still fully armed in 
that time meant that there remained some potential for instability.178  
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Traditionalism in terms of neutrality continued to dominate Finnish security 
approach in the early 1990s. This was primarily based on the country’s 
geographical location and its concerning developments in Russia. In turn, this 
made it difficult for Finland to formulate a foreign policy free from these 
traditionally oriented security policy considerations.  However, the decision to 
become a member of the EU made it possible to avoid the chance of being 
isolated in a potential future international crisis. Thus, moves towards EU 
membership represented a change of policy options rather than a change in the 
national security and defence policy. Therefore, territorial defence was still the 
main ‘code’ that defined the dominant Finnish security discourse during this time 
period.179  
Moreover, in order for Finland to become a member of the EU, a formula was 
found to combine membership with basically unaltered Finnish policies: neutrality 
was reduced to its essence180 and the consequences of EU membership were 
interpreted in rather vague terms. While there were several reasons for Finland to 
apply to join the EU, former president Mauno Koivisto has argued that the 
decision was primarily based on considerations of national security.181 This mind-
set can also be illustrated in a government report from 1992: 
 
“A capable and unified European Union in which the interest of all member states 
are taken equally into account will strengthen Finnish security. Union 
membership will help Finland to repel and military threats and prevent attempts 
to exert political pressure.”182 
 
However, in another government report, only six month after Finland joined the 
EU, it was announced that Finland was no longer neutral, since this policy was not 
compatible with the goals of the CFSP.183  
 Further, the governmental report on security in 1995 continued to emphasise 
territorial defence as the most important task. Thus, the report did call for a ‘broad 
and comprehensive concept of security’, which thought to include not only 
political and military aspects but also respect for human rights, consolidating of 
the rule of law, economic co-operation and solidarity in protecting the 
environment. However, according to Rieker, the Finnish government seized the 
opportunity to contribute to a soft security approach in the EU but the fact that the 
Union also served to strengthen Finland’s traditional and national conception did 
have priority in national defence choices.  
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 In the White Book on Defence 1997, is the EU membership emphasised as 
important for Finnish security. It states the following: 
 
“[The EU membership] increased Finland’s opportunities to influence and 
broadened its responsibility in a stability policy encompassing the whole of 
Europe”.184  
 
The White Book does also emphasise that the EU membership has strengthened 
Finland’s ability to work for security in the Baltic Sea region. Moreover, Finland 
promoted, alone or together with Sweden two central initiatives in the CFSP area: 
the Petersberg tasks and the Northern Dimension. The initiatives drew a line 
between crisis management and defence, which made it possible for non-aligned 
countries to take part on an equal footing with allied EU members.185  
 Despite Finland’s central initiatives in the CFSP dimension did the national 
security strategy continued to give priority to an independent national defence. 
Moreover, the importance of territorial defence is strongly illustrated in the report 
‘Security in a Changing World’. It is made clear that the development of crisis-
management preparedness is foremost seen as an element in strengthening 
Finland’s national defence capability.  
 
“As well as fulfilling its national defence function, Finland must create and 
enhance its preparedness for international peacekeeping and crisis management 
operations, which are more demanding military and also more diversified. Crisis 
management preparedness must be seen as a growing component in defence 
policy overall, and as a new tool for security policy and also as an element in 
strengthening the country’s defence capability”. 186 
 
As the quote indicates, preparing Finland for increased participation in 
international crisis management operations was seen as a new way of achieving 
traditional security policy goals; have a defence capability that could stand up 
against Russia. However, Finland made some adaptions in order to be able to take 
part in crisis management mission. The legislation on peacekeeping was modified 
in order to enable Finland to take part of operations that were mandated by the 
UN but executed by other organisation – like the EU.  
 In 1997, the character of Finland’s defence changed. As such, the national 
focus of the defence was tones down. Instead of maintaining a ‘credible 
independent national defence’, the new base of Finland’s security policy was now 
a ‘credible national defence capability’. The need to establish rapid-deployment 
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ground-force brigades was specially emphasised and the Finnish air force was 
strengthened through investment in American F/A-18s.187  
 In 2011, Finland’s government presented the report The Finnish Security and 
Defence Policy and for the first time, participation in international co-operation to 
enhance security and stability was stated as one of three goals in the security 
policy of Finland. However, Rieker highlights in her research that even in 2001, a 
traditional security discourse remained dominant in Finland.188  
 Moreover, according to Rieker, the changes that have been initiated in the 
Finnish defence were still based on traditional considerations. The Finnish 
defence included a strategic strike, which is the most difficult type of outside 
action to defend. As such, efforts had been made to create an army that could be 
deployed quickly to counter such a strike. For example, three brigades were made 
into rapid deployment brigades. However, Rieker argues that even if these 
brigades were not initially intended for use in international operations, their 
existence makes the Finnish defence forces better prepared for such operations. 
Finally, Rieker also shed light on the fact that participation in international co-
operation in Finland is understood as a way to rise professional skills within the 
defence force, which in turn increase the credibility of the Finnish defence effort.   
 The report from the Finnish government The Finnish Security and Defence 
Policy 2004, follows the same theme as the previous report – military crisis 
management capability are seen as an essential part of Finland’s security and 
defence policy but at the same time, this development can also contribute to 
Finland’s own defence. According to the report, Finland is developing adequately 
trained and equipped troops who can be dispatched rapidly to a crisis area and 
they should be capable of undertaking demanding action.189  
 
“International military cooperation is an essential part of Finland’s security and 
defence policy, and it supports Finland’s own defence”.190  
 
In the report from 2009, the same theme is once again possible to identify. Crisis 
management is Finland’s key foreign policy instrument and through this tool, it 
aims to promote stability of crisis areas in the world. Thus, crisis management 
seems at the same time ‘improve Finland’s own security and it contributes to 
national defence’. Further, according to the report from 2009, it is one of 
Finland’s primary interests to actively contribute to EU crisis management 
operations but major national defence reforms are scare. As such, the government 
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states clearly that Finland’s defence is based on territorial defence, general 
conscription and a large reserve.191  
 
“Crisis management is Finland’s key foreign policy instrument by which it aims 
to promote the stability of crisis areas in the world. Crisis management is about 
responsibility and participation in international cooperation. At the same time it 
improves Finland’s own security and contributes to national defence and 
international interoperability”.192  
 
In the report from 2012, the same theme still guides the Finnish security and 
defence policy. As such, the government demonstrates that Finland has a clear 
‘willingness to participate in international burden-sharing’ but the country must 
still prioritise the national territorial defence. However, this report highlights that 
Finland aims to develop the defence system. As such, a defence capability 
sufficient to repel any armed aggression is still remained but the preparedness to 
participate in military crisis management missions aims to be improved. Troops 
performance will be developed through better skills and training as well as 
material achievements.193  
 Moreover, Finland’s defence has, and will continue, to be reformed between 
2011-2015. However, in the Ministry of Defence Strategy 2025 “Security into the 
future”, the government states that ‘general conscription form a viable foundation 
for modernizing defence solutions also in the future’. As such, reforms will not 
change the conscription in Finland. Thus, the strategy highlights that military 
capabilities must be developed in such a manner that they can be flexibly used in 
international military crisis management missions. Further, units decrease in size 
but simultaneously advanced in mobility, firepower and range.194  
4.3.3 Comparative analysis 
As mentioned above in section 4.3.1, the majority of the Member States in the EU 
made major cuts in their defence budgets in the 1990´s, – which can be seen as a 
result of the budgetary crisis at that time. Noteworthy, Sweden was almost unique 
in this case; the country actually increased its defence budget. Further, Swedens 
abandon of conscription can be seen as a clear result of the Petersbergs Tasks in 
1992, and the country’s desire to surely adapt to the EU framework and to keep up 
with the development in the Union. In turn, this reform in Swedens national 
                                                                                                                                                   
 
191 Finnish Security and Defence Policy, Government report, Prime Minister’s Office, publications 13/2009, p. 
81, 99.  
192  
193 Finnish Security and Defence Policy 2012, Government report, Prime Minister’s Office, publications 1/2013.  
194 Security into the future, Ministry of Defence Strategy 2025, Ministry of Defence, ISBN 951-25-1694-2, p. 
16-20.  
  59 
defence increased the capacity to provide deployable personnel to ‘out-of-areas’ 
crisis management operations. In contrast to Sweden, Finland were one of few 
countries in the EU that actually decided to retain their conscription. This can be 
seen as reluctance to fully adapt to the EU framework but at the same time, 
Finland’s geographical position – close to Russia – is surely a factor that guided 
this choice. When it comes to the number of deployable forces, Sweden does once 
again stand out – in comparison to not only Finland but to the whole Union. The 
majority of the EU Member States reduced its umber of active personnel between 
2009 and 2013, but Sweden actually increased this number with 3600 people. As 
such, Sweden does not only stand out in relation to Finland when it comes to a 
comparison of this specific material indicators – Sweden seems to be standing out 
in relation to the whole Union.  
 Based on the discussion above in section 4.3.2, Sweden and Finland alike 
accept and underline their willingness and obligations to contribute to conflict 
prevention and crisis management in the EU. As such, both countries express 
intent to increase and improve their capacity to take part in international missions 
and both countries had made defence reforms in order to adapt to the new security 
environment. However, the Swedish government seems to characterize national 
and international tasks as ‘sides of a coin’, while Finland puts stronger emphasis 
on the defence of national territory. As such, the main difference is not that 
Sweden puts more focus than Finland on international missions but rather that 
Finland emphasizes national defence to a greater extent than Sweden.195  
 Moreover, Sweden have also made major changes in the national defence and 
peacekeeping legislation, for example abandon conscription and reduce the need 
for a UN-mandate, which in turn extends the operational capacity to take part of 
CSDP military missions. As such, Sweden has prioritized participation in CSDP 
military operations and therefore, the country has adapt the national defence to a 
high degree. In contrast, Finland has not made any major reforms of the national 
defence, and the discourse that ‘we will defence ourselves’ has been extended to 
the future.196 For example, the general conscription is still used in Finnish security 
and defence policy. As a result, Finland has only adapted the national defence to a 
low degree since the country priorities national territorial defence.  
 In addition, the material indicators of adaption do strengthen this standpoint 
since the values of the majorities in Sweden have changed to a higher value 
during the referent period. In contrast, the majorities of the indicators for Finland 
changed to a lower value. Based on this comparison between Sweden and Finland, 
it is argued that Sweden has adapted its national defence to a higher degree than 
Finland.  
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5 Conclusion  
This chapter will present the conclusions from the empirical analyse. It will first 
examine a discussion of the empirical findings in this paper, which aims to answer 
the research question presented in the first chapter. Second, it will discuss 
theoretical contributions regarding first the concept of burden-sharing and then the 
concept of adaption of national defence. Third, empirical and theoretical 
generalization opportunities from this paper are examined. Finally, the chapter 
summarizes concluding remarks and provide suggestions to further research in the 
sphere of CSDP military operations and Foreign Policy Analysis.  
5.1 Empirical findings 
This thesis raised the question of how adaption of national defence can explain 
different degrees of burden-sharing in EU military operations. In order to answer 
this research question, a comparative case study was made. The case study of 
operation Atalanta showed that adaption plays an important role when authors aim 
to explain burden-sharing in EU military operations. However, in order to answer 
the research question, the relationship between adaption of national defence and 
burden-sharing must first be examined. Step two will be to present specifically 
how adaption of national defence can explain different degrees of burden-sharing.  
 In the empirical analysis, a profound correlation between adaption of national 
defence and burden-sharing in operation Atalanta was seen; when the independent 
variable took the value ‘high’ the dependent variable did also took the value 
‘high’. In the case of Sweden and Finland, this basic finding is illustrated in the 
figure below. 
 
 
 Sweden Finland 
 
Degree of burden-sharing 
 
 
High 
 
Low 
 
Degree of adaption 
 
 
High 
 
Low 
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Since this correlation is to be seen in the empirical analysis, hypothesis number one in 
this thesis can be accepted.  
 
 
A high degree of adaption of national defence results in a high degree of burden-
sharing in CSDP military operations. 
 
 
Since a correlation between adaption and burden-sharing is to be seen, step two 
can now be discussed – how adaption can explain different degrees of burden-
sharing. The case study of this paper shows that that Finland and Sweden gives 
different priorities to CSDP military operations in national defence planning. 
Nevertheless, Finland still does prioritise territorial defence, while Sweden 
consider national and international tasks as ‘sides of a coin’. Moreover, Sweden 
has made major changes in the national defence, which have favoured 
participation in CSDP military operations. As mentioned above, one example is 
the fact that Sweden has abandoned conscription and changed peacekeeping 
legislation. In contrast, Finland still has a comprehensive defence and only limited 
defence reforms have been made in the last decade. For example, conscription is 
still used and EU missions are seen as a factor that will improve the country’s 
own defence. However, Finland’s geopolitical position is in turn a central reason 
for this defence strategy but at the same time, this can be seen as an expression of 
unwillingness to take responsibility for collective security. In addition, the 
intentions of Sweden’s defence reforms and priority of CSDP military operations 
seems to be characterized by the will to protect human rights and contribute to a 
safer world. In contrast, Finland’s intentions with the defence reforms and 
participation in international missions seem to be characterized by the will to 
practice the national defence. As such, through Finland’s participation in EU 
operations, the country will be better equipped to protect its own national 
territory. In sum, Swedens adaption of the national defence to the EU framework 
has generated an operational capacity to take part of EU military operations. 
Consequently, Sweden can and also takes a high degree of burden-sharing in 
operation Atalanta. Regarding Finland, the degree of adaption is limited in 
relation to Sweden and therefore, the operational capacity if affected. However, 
Finland has the operational capacity to take part of CSDP military operations but 
due to different priorities, the country takes a low degree of burden-sharing in 
operation Atalanta.  
In general, adaption of national defence can explain the different degrees 
of burden-sharing in EU military operations by the fact that EU Member States 
gives different priorities to CSDP military operations in their national defence. 
These different priorities affect the operational capacity of the Member States to 
participate in CSDP military operations. As a result, Member States have different 
defence qualifications that affect their practical contributions to EU military 
operations. However, at first sight, this may seem evident but as mentioned in the 
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theoretical framework, political decision-makers in the Union does not always 
take practical resource constrains into consideration when a new operation should 
be realised. Thereby, a Member State can have the political will to participate in a 
EU military mission but this approach should be seen as the last element in the 
process. First, resources and operational capacity is needed – thereby adaption. 
Second, the political will is required. As such, these two ingredients are both 
important.   
5.2 Theoretical contributions 
This thesis has introduced a particular theoretical framework for the purpose of 
evaluating how adaption could explain different degrees of burden-sharing in EU 
military operations. The theoretical points of departure were found in the 
framework of FPA; a framework that has proven capacity to account for the 
variation between Sweden and Finland’s degree of burden-sharing in operation 
Atalanta. The next two sections will discuss theoretical findings; first regarding 
the concept of burden-sharing and then regarding the concept of adaption of 
national defence. At the end of this section, empirical and theoretical 
generalization opportunities will be examined.  
 
Burden-sharing 
As mentioned throughout this paper, the theoretical framework has been 
developed by the use of Niklas Nováky’s research of burden-sharing. The focus 
has been on the factors that Nováky classifies as ‘material’ and his endogenous 
variables have been used in order to measure adaption and his exogenous 
variables has been used in order to measure burden-sharing. As such, the new 
model that was developed in this thesis did not take immaterial variables from 
different levels of analysis into account. Consequently, this paper took a more 
practical approach when it comes to analyse burden-sharing in EU military 
operations. As such, a more abstract and theoretical manner could have been 
obtained if immaterial variables also were included in the analytical model. 
Furthermore, if more variables have been incorporated in the new model, it would 
be possible to further examine and compare which factor that had the greatest 
impact on the dependent variable and also discuss different levels of analysis. 
Thus, by only focusing on one variable – adaption of national defence – a more 
in-depth analysis has been made and the causal relationship between the 
independent variable and the dependent variable is stated with more significance.  
Specifically, the concept of burden-sharing was measured through the 
indicators of resources required for operations (profile of operations and intensity 
of conflict) and contributions of operational resources. As such, the contributions 
of operational resources were put in the context of operation Atalanta and the 
degree of burden-sharing was based on if the specific contributions from Sweden 
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and Finland were critical for the realisation of operation Atalanta or not. This 
three-step approach made it possible to analyse national contributions not only in 
terms of numbers but also in terms of the military context. As such, this thesis has 
evaluated burden-sharing relative to the significance of specific contributions. 
Further, in relation to previous research regarding burden-sharing, this thesis has 
also shown the importance to include the flexibility that EU Member States have 
when it comes to adapt to the EU framework or not.  
Further, Nováky’s immaterial variables are more in line with classical FPA, 
where factors like ‘threat perception’ and ‘political will’ gives a lot of priority. 
However, it can be mentioned that the connection between operational capacity 
and decision-makers should be identified to a higher extent within the framework 
of Foreign Policy Analysis.  
 
Adaption of national defence 
The theoretical framework in this paper treats also adaption in a more practical 
manner: it suggest that EU Member States need to take practical undertakings in 
their national defence in order to adapt to the EU framework, and it continues to 
guide participation in CSDP military operations through operational capacity. As 
such, adaption has been measured through the material indicators of economic 
resources (size of defence budget and size of defence), military resources (number 
of deployable forces, professional forces/conscription and existing deployments) 
and priority of CSDP military operations (national defence planning). As the 
observant reader may notice, the first two indicators – economic and military 
resources – are more practical indicators while the last one – priority of CSDP 
military operations – is of a more abstract manner. As such, while the practical 
indicators account for some of the degree of participation in Sweden and Finland, 
they are not capable of producing a comprehensive explanation alone. Therefore, 
it is worth mentioning that the analytical framework takes these factors into 
account due to their inherent logics. To make clear, the analysis departed from the 
proposition that the operational capacity of a specific EU Member State, in time 
of a military operation, was critical for the question to participate or not. 
However, these practical indicators needs to be complemented with an indicator 
of a more theoretical approach – priority of CSDP military operations, a factor 
that is also possible to analyse during a longer time period. As such, it is of high 
importance to analyse not only the time-period of the operation but also to extend 
the referent period and go back in time in order to analyse priority of CSDP in 
national defence reforms.  
However, adaption can be used and measured in many different ways. For 
example, it can be measured through socialization, or it can take a more 
rationalistic approach. Depending on which dimension of the concept the 
researcher use, different conclusions are surely to be seen. As mentioned, the 
approach of adaption in this paper takes a more practical manner and this has its 
both advantages and disadvantages. As such, when using the concept in this way, 
it facilitates for the researcher to measure adaption. In contrast, it can be 
  64 
challenging to make it fit into a theoretical model. However, since the practical 
indicators were complemented by ‘priority of CSDP’, this thesis intended to make 
the model more theoretical but at the same time – usable in empirical studies.  
5.2.1 Empirical and theoretical generalization opportunities  
So, what are the generalization opportunities in this paper? Can this findings fly? 
In general, the empirical findings can be argued to be able to apply to other 
military operations where similar countries participated in different ways. More 
specific, adaption of national defence assumes to be able to explain different 
degrees of burden-sharing, not only in EU military operations but also military 
operations made by other organisations – like NATO. Further, adaption of 
national defence can also be applied to other countries than Sweden and Finland – 
material indicators and national defence planning are indicators that can be 
applied to almost any country in the world.  In addition, the theoretical findings in 
this paper can also be argued to fly. As such, the findings shows that the 
relationship between political decision-makers and resource constrains are of 
importance to include in theoretical frameworks regarding burden-sharing in 
military operations. As Engberg has argued before, this relationship is not that 
black or white in reality and this is a factor that needs to be included in the 
theoretical context of FPA and burden-sharing.   
5.3 Concluding remarks  
As concluding words, although the theoretical model in this paper cannot 
adequately explain all aspects in the case of different degrees of burden-sharing in 
operation Atalanta, it has been relevant to look at adaption of national defence 
when analysing CSDP military operations. More specific, if EU Member States 
doesn’t adapt their national defence to the EU framework, the Union will maybe 
not be able to carry out CSDP military operations in the future due to the lack of 
operational capacity. As such, CSDP military operations require more than 
political will – it requires that the EU Member States take practical adjustments in 
their national defence and work together as a collective use of force. However, as 
long as flexibility appears for the EU Member States to decide for them self if, 
and to what extent, they would like to adapt their national defence to the EU 
framework – adaption can explain different degrees of burden-sharing. This by 
shed light on the difference of operational resources and the different priorities of 
CSDP in national defence planning between EU Member States.  
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5.3.1 Further research 
Like the first chapter of this paper mentioned, there is a gap in the literature when 
it comes to analyse burden-sharing in CSDP military operations and the role of 
adaption. Therefore, this relationship needs more research and the use of FPA 
makes it possible to analyse other operations than Atalanta and also, other 
countries than Sweden and Finland. Thus, a comparison of Sweden and Finland 
can be complemented by including Austria, a EU Member that is not either a 
member of NATO and also has applied a neutral policy in history. Moreover, it 
would be interesting to compare countries contributions in different CSDP 
military operations, in order to analyse adaption in a different way.  
 
  66 
6 Appendixes 
This chapter will present the Appendixes in this paper. Appendix 1 illustrates 
Nováky’s model of independent factors affecting burden-sharing. Appendix 2 
illustrates how the profile of operation Atalanta will be examined. Appendix 3 
illustrates Sweden and Finland contributions.  
6.1 Appendix 1 
 
Independent Variables Affecting Burden-Sharing 
 
 Material Immaterial 
Endogenous 
 
Economic resources: 
• Size of defence budget 
• Size of defence expenditure 
 
Military resources: 
• Number of deployable 
forces 
• Professional 
forces/conscription 
• Existing deployments 
Public-level: 
• Public opinion 
• Visibility of conflict (“CNN effect”) 
 
Government-level: 
• Threat perception 
• Parliamentary approval 
• Political will 
• Support for CFSP/CSDP 
• Solidarity towards other EU states 
Exogenous 
 
 
Resources required for operation: 
• Profile of operations 
• Intensity of conflict 
 
Relations with target: 
• Economic relations 
 
Regional-level: 
• Language of target country 
• Previous experience from target region  
 
International-level: 
• UN mandate 
• Political relations with target 
• Relations with NATO/US 
• Pressure from other EU Member States 
 
6.2 Appendix 2 
Profile of operation Atalanta 
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Character of conflict 
 
 
Mandate of the mission  
Time period 
 
 
Other international actors in the area 
 
 
Task of the mission  
Availability of relevant forces  
Scare resources  
Availability of financial resources  
 
6.3 Appendix 3  
 
Nation/year of 
contributions 
 
Sweden 
 
Finland 
 
2009 
• Marine 
contribution  
 
 
2010 • Marine 
contribution  
 
2011 • Officers to OHQ • Marine contribution 
2012  
 
 
2013 • Marine 
contribution  
• Contribution of 25 
soldiers  
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